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ARTICLES
THE EVOLUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE
CONUNDRUM OF STRICT LIABILITY
ALEX GRANT*
INTRODUCTION
Few statements of Massachusetts law have been as con
founding and as frequently repeated as this: liability under the im
plied warranty of merchantability is congruent in nearly all respects
with strict products liability in tort.1 Coming to terms with what
strict products liability2 really means has been the central issue
throughout the modern era of Massachusetts products liability law.3
Massachusetts courts have struggled to articulate workable stan
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
1. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978).
2. As discussed in Part I of this Article, there is, strictly speaking, “no strict liabil
ity in tort” in Massachusetts because the implied warranty of merchantability, in MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314-318 (2008), has been thought to do essentially the same
duty. Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 62-64 (Mass. 1978). This Article will
take note of the limited circumstances in which the theoretical distinction between the
implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort has made a difference, but
it will refer to “strict liability” as the concept which purports to underlie the implied
warranty of merchantability.
3. See David R. Geiger & Stephanie Copp Martinez, Design and Warning Defect
Claims Under Massachusetts Product Liability Law: Completing the Merger of Negli
gence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON B. J. 12, 12-13 (1999). The modern era of Massachu
setts products liability law will be referred to in this Article as the period beginning in
1971 when MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314-318, was originally amended to create a
remedy for injured plaintiffs similar to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
1
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dards that advance consumer protection.4 In 2010, forty-five years
after section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts heralded a
new enlightened era of products liability law, that process is still not
complete. The evolution of modern Massachusetts products liabil
ity law, which began with the notion that the traditional negligence
cause of action in tort was inadequate in a complex economy with
sophisticated consumer products, has shown that negligence con
cepts still animate, and should animate, most products liability
cases. The resilience of negligence theory in Massachusetts law is
owed, in part, to its effectiveness in advancing worthy public policy
goals.5 But this resilience also stems from unfortunate choices Mas
sachusetts courts have made in constructing implied warranty of
merchantability doctrine. Warranty liability doctrine purports to be
a robust mechanism for holding manufacturers and sellers responsi
ble for their defective products.6 In reality, Massachusetts courts
have made the implied warranty of merchantability into a cause of
action that over-promises and under-delivers. A frank acknowledg
ment of that fact would be a significant benefit to the courts, law
yers, consumers, manufacturers, and product sellers.
This Article will contend that “strict liability,” at least as the
concept has been used in Massachusetts products liability law, has
no independent, widely-understood meaning. It has served mainly
as a rhetorical device to express commendable aspirations about
consumer protection and for progressive social policy in general. It
has, on the other hand, failed to serve as a useful principle for de
ciding actual cases. Strict liability,7 understood in its most basic
sense as liability without fault, cannot be reconciled with how Mas
sachusetts courts have decided most products liability cases in the
modern era, a truth that the Supreme Judicial Court has only re
cently and fitfully begun to acknowledge.8 That is not to say that
the preference for the strict liability label has been anything less
4. Geiger & Martinez, supra note 3, at 13.
5. See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998) (re
jecting strict liability “hindsight approach” in favor of negligence-style standard in fail
ure to warn cases by noting “[t]he goal of the law is to induce conduct that is capable of
being performed”).
6. See Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass.
1983) (warranty liability imposes on product sellers “duty . . . unknown in the law of
negligence” requiring sellers to “stand behind their goods”).
7. See Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Mass.
1975) (strict liability is “absolute liability without fault”).
8. Compare Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Mass. 2001) (“[W]e [have]
abandoned the strict liability approach to implied warranties of merchantability . . . .”),
with Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 2006) (“Warranty liabil

R
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than hugely influential during the modern era. The meaning of
strict liability language has to be understood within the factual cir
cumstances of each decision in which it has been invoked. Scholars
and products liability practitioners should understand that refer
ences to strict liability and its supposed counterpoint, negligence, by
Massachusetts courts are really questions, rather than explanations.
A keen observer will use these references to ask, “what does the
court really mean by strict liability (or negligence) here?” This Ar
ticle will attempt to be precise about the meaning behind these la
bels wherever they are used.
Part I of this Article will describe the beginnings of the modern
era by analyzing the still seminal decisions from the mid-to-late
1970s. In doing so, it will first place the new strict liability regime in
context by sketching the state of the law before the amendments to
the implied warranty of merchantability were passed between 1971
and 1974.9 This background will illuminate the perceived shortcom
ings in Massachusetts products liability doctrine, and it will define
the problems the makers of this new products liability doctrine saw
as they began to interpret the new warranty cause of action. This
Article will argue that these early cases confronted some of the
most difficult issues in products liability law, broke important
ground, and arrived at sound decisions which have stood the test of
time.
Part II of this Article will discuss a period during the 1980s and
1990s during which Massachusetts courts, enamored with the idea
of strict liability, went off course by producing decisions that were
logically inconsistent with each other and with precedent. These
cases imposed duties on manufacturers and sellers that could not be
carried out in the real world. To counterbalance these onerous du
ties, the Supreme Judicial Court created the unreasonable use doctrine,10 which has hampered the ability of injured plaintiffs to
recover damages to the point where traditional negligence claims
have often been more fruitful than implied warranty claims. In
short, modern products liability law in Massachusetts became a
muddle that did not promote the public policies it ostensibly sup
ported. It was during this period that federal courts in Massachu
setts diverged from the state courts they were supposedly following,
ity is ‘fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery . . . .’” (quoting
Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978)).
9. See Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Mass. 1978)
(describing 1971 and 1974 amendments).
10. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040-41.
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to the point that they developed a separate and more enlightened
doctrine. All of this produced a period of painful confusion, a con
dition that has not altogether dissipated, even today.
Part III treats the most recent part of the modern era, from the
Supreme Judicial Court’s 1998 decision in Vassallo v. Baxter Health
care Corp.11 to the present, in which Massachusetts courts have
backtracked from some of the rhetorical flourishes of the “mud
dled” period and have begun to define strict liability in more logi
cal, practical terms. Vassallo, which sensibly decided that
manufacturers and sellers had no duty to warn of dangers that ex
perts could not have known about, was a much-needed prick to the
strict liability balloon, but it remains a partial step toward a func
tional, policy-driven methodology for deciding products liability
cases.12 After Vassallo, Massachusetts products liability law is still
saddled with wooden rules that unnaturally limit and enlarge liabil
ity.13 The unreasonable use defense endures with its capacity to
confuse juries and to protect defendants who could have prevented
serious injuries with reasonable accident avoidance measures.14
Most surprisingly, key issues remain unclear due to contradictory
precedent, despite ample opportunity to clarify them.15
This Article will argue that Massachusetts products liability law
should worry less about parsing the concepts of “negligence” and
“strict liability” and focus more on the fact that current law includes
both fault-based and non-fault-based standards. This Article will
further argue that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia
bility, with its agnosticism about doctrinal labels,16 provides a rubric
that is largely consistent with the core concepts of Massachusetts
products liability law, minus some of its less enlightened elements,
and one which would fill in the gaps of the current jurisprudence.
Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability as a
guide to interpreting the implied warranty of merchantability would
provide benefits to deserving litigants on both sides and would bet
ter serve the social policies of consumer protection, consumer
choice, and compensation to injured persons.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
Id. at 923.
See infra section III.
See infra section III.C.
See infra section III.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998).
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I.

SKETCHING OUT

THE
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MODERN DOCTRINE (1975-1978)

The Massachusetts judges who decided the first products liabil
ity cases after the implied warranty of merchantability was
amended between 1971 and 1974 began their construction of the
strict liability doctrine with an understanding of negligence and
warranty cases that stretched back several decades.17 These cases
exposed deficiencies in the injured plaintiff’s right to recovery that
the statutory amendments were clearly designed to address.18 Only
by understanding the state of the law prior to 1971 is it possible to
appreciate how the implied warranty of merchantability was
shaped, and how it should have been shaped.
A. The Pre-Modern Era and the Problems the New Implied
Warranty Cause of Action Was Trying to Solve
1. Rise and Fall of the Privity Rule in Negligence Actions
In the early twentieth century, persons injured by consumer or
industrial products were confronted at the outset with the privity
requirement, which demanded that a plaintiff show a contractual
relationship with the defendant.19 While this understandably ap
plied to contractual remedies such as the breach of an express war
ranty, it had been applied to the tort doctrine of negligence as a
bulwark to the unwarranted expansion of liability to an unlimited
class of plaintiffs.20 Stemming from the 1842 English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright,21 this rule spread throughout the United
States, including Massachusetts.22 Thus, in the 1866 case of Davidson v. Nichols, a plaintiff, having bought a potion in a bottle from a
retailer, was barred from recovering in negligence from the whole
17. In doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Mass. 1975), the first signifi
cant products liability case to be decided after the 1971 and 1974 amendments, the court
cited and relied upon numerous pre-modern cases, indicating that it was well aware of
the pre-modern case law.
18. See infra section I.A.
19. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 698-700 (Mass. 1946) (recounting
history of privity rule).
20. See Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 482-83 (Mass. 1907). The
court noted that:
If such an extended liability attached where no privity of contract exists it
would include all persons however remote who had been damaged either in
person or property by his carelessness, and manufacturers as a class would be
exposed to such far-reaching consequences as to seriously embarrass the gen
eral prosecution of mercantile business.
Id.
21. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.).
22. Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 698.
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sale druggist who had sold the potion to the retailer.23 The Su
preme Judicial Court came to this result assuming that the
wholesale druggist had mistakenly placed the wrong mixture in the
bottle through “negligence and want of skill,” that the bottle had
been sealed prior to its delivery to the retailer, and that the con
sumer had suffered severe injuries when the concoction had ex
ploded.24 Davidson held that the wholesale druggist owed no duty
to the plaintiff simply because he owed no duty in contract.25
Harsh results such as these began a prompt search for excep
tions to the privity rule.26 Soon carved out from the operation of
the privity rule were inherently dangerous products, which included
explosives such as gunpowder and nitroglycerine, as well as poison
ous drugs.27 Also finding refuge in this exception was a man apply
ing stain to a room who struck a match and ignited the fumes that
had been released from the stain.28 Massachusetts courts thus dis
tinguished “inherently dangerous” or “intrinsically harmful” prod
ucts from those that are ordinarily harmless, unless they contain
some defect.29 This exception grew to include many consumer
products, including combs placed in a woman’s hair to produce a
wave hairstyle.30 The combs themselves could not cause injury, but
when placed in the hair and subjected to hot air from an electric
dryer, they released a flammable chemical.31 The combs caught fire
and caused burns to a woman’s head.32 Farley v. Edward E. Tower
& Co. found the combs to be inherently dangerous, reasoning that
“the dangerous quality of an article is none the less inherent be
cause it is brought into action by some external force.”33
Carter v. Yardley & Co. put an end to these creative circum
ventions of the privity rule by abolishing it in 1946.34 By that time,
the privity rule had been dead for thirty years in New York, follow
23. Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 514, 516-20 (1866).
24. Id. at 516.
25. Id. at 518-19.
26. See Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 698.
27. See Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 482-83 (Mass. 1907).
28. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491-92 (Mass. 1915).
29. Id. at 491; see Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 641 (Mass.
1930) (“Danger is inherent when it is due to the nature of an article and not to a defect
in an article naturally harmless . . . .”).
30. Farley, 171 N.E. at 640.
31. Id. at 640-41.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 641.
34. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946).
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ing Justice Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in
which he famously declared that:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in
the law.35

By the time Carter was decided, there was no need for the
boldness or eloquence of Justice Cardozo because the majority of
jurisdictions had already abandoned the privity rule.36 It was
enough to observe that the distinctions from the “inherently dan
gerous” exception lacked any “rational basis.”37
2. Pre-Modern Cases Limited to Hidden Dangers with
Wholly Innocent Victims
Having torn down the artificial privity barrier for negligence
actions, but maintaining it for express warranty or implied warranty
claims,38 the Supreme Judicial Court was still faced with defining
the duties owed by product manufacturers and sellers to the con
sumer. The pre-modern cases in Massachusetts tended to stem
from situations where hidden dangers in the product had caused
injury to unsuspecting users.39 Products liability suits fell into two
general categories: (1) hidden manufacturing defects, and (2) fail
ure to warn of hidden, inherent dangers in the product.40 Today,
this represents only a portion of the modern products liability
docket.41 It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers did not even conceive of
trying to hold manufacturers and sellers responsible for design
choices that created obvious but avoidable dangers.42 Likewise,
35. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Corp., 111 N.E.1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
36. Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 700.
37. Id. at 698-99.
38. Id. at 695 n.2.
39. See infra sections I.A.3 and I.A.4.
40. See infra sections I.A.3 and I.A.4.
41. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 483-84
(1990) (describing how products liability litigation has come to include design defect
claims and how significant design issues have become in products liability law).
42. Of course, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, not
abolished until 1969 and 1973, respectively, were powerful deterrents to all but wholly
innocent plaintiffs. See Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-84 (Mass.
1980) (describing defenses and their histories). On the other hand, published decisions
relating to products liability and the assumption of the risk defense are virtually non
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Massachusetts courts were not called upon to grapple with injuries
stemming from uses of the product that departed from the uses that
the manufacturer had intended. In warning cases, plaintiffs alleged
a complete lack of warning, rather than complaining that the warn
ing was inadequate, incomplete, or failed to capture the user’s
attention.43
It should be quickly noted that the foregoing observation
about these two categories of products liability cases suggests a de
gree of analytical rigor that Massachusetts courts did not them
selves apply. Similarly, products liability jurisprudence in most
states remained focused on the issues surrounding manufacturing
defects, and to some extent, warning claims.44 Design claims had
not been, in a sense, invented yet.45 William Prosser, in his influen
tial 1960 article The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), spoke of holding sellers responsible for manufacturing
defects, even as he made the argument for strict liability in almost
revolutionary terms.46
In 1965, when the American Law Institute adopted section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a provision also au
thored by Prosser, it focused on manufacturing defects.47 “Section
402A had little to say about liability for design defects or for prod
ucts sold with inadequate warnings. In the early 1960s, these areas
of litigation were in their infancy.”48
3. Pre-Modern Warning Cases
The presence of a hidden danger and the unquestioned exer
cise of due care by the plaintiff, were common to the pre-modern
Massachusetts cases that recognized liability, or at least potential
liability, on the part of a manufacturer or seller. In a typical pre
existent in Massachusetts during the pre-modern era. This shows that plaintiffs’ lawyers
were not bringing products liability cases that tested the limits of the defense.
43. Compare Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 641-42 (Mass.
1930), with MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm.Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998) (describing
how products liability began with manufacturing defects and extended to design and
most warning claims only in the 1960s and 1970s).
45. See id.
46. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Liability for hidden manufacturing defects has a
history dating back to medieval English law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. b (1965) (noting high degree of responsibility for food products dating
back to 1266).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt.
48. Id.
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modern warning case, the Supreme Judicial Court could confidently
say that:
[I]t is settled that a person who sells an article, which he knows is
inherently dangerous to human life, limb or health, to another
person, who has no knowledge of its true character, and fails to
give notice thereof to the purchaser, is liable in damages to a
third person who, while in the exercise of due care, is injured by a
use of it which should have been contemplated by the seller.49

In the 1961 case of Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,
the plaintiff was a nine year old girl who went to a hair salon where
a lotion was applied to her hair.50 The lotion was to be used with a
heating pad, and the combination of the two produced an ammonia
gas that caused burns to the child’s scalp.51 Free of the privity re
quirement and the need to evade it, Mealey was presented with the
traditional negligence inquiries of whether the injury was foresee
able and whether the manufacturer had breached its duty of due
care by failing to give notice of the danger.52 Mealey had no
trouble in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff where the manufac
turer’s instructions had directed the use of a heating pad with the
lotion and had said nothing about the danger of burns.53
One notable exception to the fairly straightforward warning
cases like Mealey was the Supreme Judicial Court’s 1961 decision in
Ricciutti v. Sylvania Electric Products Inc.,54 which proved to be a
forerunner to the toxic tort litigation of the modern era. In warning
cases where the manufacturer had simply neglected to warn of a
hidden danger the plaintiff had no way of suspecting, the basic duty
to warn was unquestioned.55 In Ricciutti, the manufacturer dis
claimed such a duty where the plaintiff had contracted berylliosis
from having been exposed to beryllium while working with the de
fendant’s florescent tubes some years earlier.56 The manufacturer
sought to show that it did not know about the risk of disease at the
time it sold the products which allegedly harmed the plaintiff.57
49. Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 640 (Mass. 1930).
50. Mealy v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp., 173 N.E.2d 84, 85-86 (Mass. 1961).
51. Id. at 86.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ricciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc., 178 N.E.2d 857, 860-62 (Mass. 1961).
55. See Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 642 (Mass. 1930) (stating
that while knowledge of risk is presumed, it is clear that manufacturer, in fact, did know
of the risk).
56. Ricciutti, 178 N.E.2d at 860-62.
57. Id.
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The trial court sustained the manufacturer’s objection to a jury in
struction which would have said that “[e]very manufacturer is pre
sumed to know the nature and quality of his products.”58 On
appeal, Ricciutti held that the plaintiff was required to prove that
the defendant “knew or through the exercise of reasonable care
should have known that his product was dangerous.”59 Prior Mas
sachusetts cases had lent support to the presumption of knowledge
advocated by the plaintiff.60 In fact, the proposed jury instruction
had been a familiar incantation in warning cases for decades.
Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co. had explicitly held that “[p]roof
. . . of actual knowledge is not required where the article is so made
up as to be inherently harmful.”61 In the earlier cases, the courts
were dealing with simpler products, and they had not been con
fronted with products involving a complex disease process that took
many years to manifest itself.62
Ricciutti eschewed the presumption of knowledge that Massa
chusetts courts had blithely applied in cases where the manufac
turer’s lack of knowledge about the dangers posed by its products
was not seriously presented. This presumption would be resur
rected in the 1980s in Massachusetts and elsewhere with a “hind
sight” test, where in the name of strict liability, the manufacturer
and seller of a product would be presumed to know of dangers dis
covered after the sale of the product.63 The Supreme Judicial Court
would later repudiate precedent, as it did in Ricciutti, to again re
quire the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew or should have
known of the dangerous quality of the product.64
4. Pre-Modern Manufacturing Defect Cases
Manufacturing defect cases during the pre-modern era in
volved hidden imperfections that caused injuries when the products
were used as the manufacturer intended.65 Plaintiffs bringing negli
gence actions faced practical problems of proving how the manufac
turer’s negligence in the production or quality control process had
58. Id. at 861.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 861-62 (citing cases advanced by plaintiff).
61. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491 (Mass. 1915).
62. See, e.g., Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 694-95 (perfume caused
immediate burns to skin).
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. See infra Part III.A.
65. See Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 344-46 (Mass. 1959)
(canvassing manufacturing defect cases involving bottles and other products).
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allowed a defective product to enter the marketplace.66 In these
cases, the concept of “defect” had a straightforward meaning since
the product, such as a soda bottle containing a crack, departed from
the intended design. When the product, like a shattering soda bot
tle,67 would fail suddenly, often in catastrophic fashion, the plaintiff
would be left with little evidence of what exactly the imperfection
was, and little ability to trace the defect back to the specific act of
negligence that had been visited upon one of a multitude of seem
ingly identical products.68
In the 1959 case of Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., the
Supreme Judicial Court was presented with a claim by a woman
who was injured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand.69 At
trial, the plaintiff sued the bottler in negligence but presented no
evidence of a specific act of negligence on the part of the bottler.70
Instead, she relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to draw an
inference of negligence because such an unusual event would not
have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.71 Because
her evidence consisted of broken pieces of glass, the plaintiff could
not even say whether the bottle had contained an imperfection in
the glass, had been given an excessive amount of carbonation, or
had been mishandled.72 Evangelio allowed recovery, finding as a
matter of common knowledge that an exploding bottle permitted
an inference of negligence, where it was clear that the bottle had
not been mishandled since it had left the hands of the bottler.73 In
doing so, it overruled prior cases which held that the plaintiff must
show a specific act of negligence.74
The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the res ipsa loquitor infer
ence of negligence in a 1963 case involving a manufacturing defect
66. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438-39 (Cal.
1944) (res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence permitted where it was unclear even in
hindsight what kind of manufacturing defect caused product to fail); Evangelio, 158
N.E.2d at 344-46.
67. Evangelio, 158 N.E.2d at 343-44.
68. See id. at 344-46; Escola, 150 P.2d at 438-39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998) (often manufacturing defects are caused by de
fendant’s negligence but plaintiff has trouble proving it).
69. Evangelio, 158 N.E.2d at 342-44.
70. Id. at 344.
71. Id. at 344-45.
72. Id. at 346-47 (acknowledging multiple possible causes of product failure).
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id. (overruling Howard v. Lowell Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 78 N.E.2d 7 (Mass.
1948)).
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in an automobile’s transmission.75 The plaintiff was able, through
expert testimony, to identify the problem in the transmission.76 The
inference that the problem stemmed from negligence in the manu
facture of the car was appropriate because the vehicle had not left
the car dealer’s lot at the time of the accident.77
The limits of negligence theory, res ipsa loquitur, and the im
plied warranty of merchantability remedy were exposed in a 1970
case that played a significant role in bringing about the amend
ments to section 2-314 through 2-31878 between 1971 and 1974. In
Necktas v. General Motors Corp.,79 a man had purchased a new
General Motors (GM) automobile from a dealer, and he drove it
about 500 miles in the next fifteen days before he was involved in a
fatal accident caused by a defective power steering unit.80 The
man’s estate sued GM and the dealer for negligence and breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability.81 Necktas held that there
was sufficient evidence that there had been a defect in the power
steering unit at the time of sale and that this constituted a breach of
warranty.82 The plaintiff could not recover against GM on the war
ranty claim due to lack of privity, but it could recover from the
dealer on the warranty claim because the dealer had sold the car
directly to the decedent.83 However, the plaintiff could not, based
on the breach of warranty, recover damages due to the man’s death,
since by statute, such a remedy existed only if there had been either
“negligence or . . . a wilful, wanton or reckless act causing death.”84
Meanwhile, the court found that the plaintiff had presented insuffi
cient evidence of negligence on the part of GM or the dealer be
cause the evidence about the nature of the defect was not specific
enough.85
Necktas showed how the combination of negligence theory and
the implied warranty of merchantability could be inadequate in the
pre-modern era to provide an avenue for compensation in a deserv
ing case. The automobile contained a dangerous flaw at the time of
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.E.2d 301, 304-05 (Mass. 1963).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314 to -318 (2008).
Necktas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 259 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Mass. 1970).
Id.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.
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sale which was hidden to the consumer.86 The product did not per
form as it was intended to perform, and the resulting injury was
fatal.87 The court did not indulge in the res ipsa loquitor inference
of negligence where the product was more complex than an explod
ing soda bottle, and “common knowledge”88 provided little in the
way of explanation for the accident.89 The court was satisfied that
the plaintiff had proven a defect, but the plaintiff had not provided
specific evidence about acts of negligence giving rise to that defect
on the part of GM or the dealer.90 The inability to prove negli
gence then precluded recovery for the man’s death.91 GM, the ob
vious culprit for the faulty power steering unit, escaped liability
altogether.92 These anomalies paved the way for passage of the
new implied warranty of merchantability statute.
B. Section 402A and the Strict Liability Wave
Outside of Massachusetts, momentum had been building for an
explicit recognition of strict liability in tort for manufacturing de
fects. A number of jurisdictions recognized strict liability for food
products in the early twentieth century, and the rule spread to the
majority of jurisdictions and to a number of other products by the
1950s.93 Numerous legal scholars had been writing during the 1950s
about the inadequacies of warranty law and the need to expand
strict liability beyond food products.94 In 1960, New Jersey adopted
a general theory of strict liability in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo
tors, Inc., through the implied warranty of merchantability by strip
ping away the privity requirement and by invalidating the
manufacturer’s disclaimers, which prevented recovery for personal
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Mass. 1959).
89. Necktas, 259 N.E.2d at 235-38 (holding evidence of negligence insufficient in
face of dissent that argued that jury could make inference negligence based on common
knowledge).
90. Id. at 236.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Prosser, supra note 46, at 1106-14.
94. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles From the Yale Law Journal, 100
YALE L.J. 1449, 1470 (1991) (Prosser’s Assault Upon the Citadel was one of many arti
cles criticizing the limitations of warranty law arguing for the expansion of strict
liability).
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injury.95 In 1962, California became the first jurisdiction to hold
that strict liability in tort would apply to all products.96
All of this set the stage for the American Law Institute to pub
lish Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1965. Although Pros
ser, the Restatement’s author, had predicted that adoption of strict
liability across the United States could take fifty years, section
402A “spread like wildfire” to virtually every jurisdiction from the
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.97 Some jurisdictions almost immedi
ately followed California’s lead in adopting section 402A and strict
liability in tort.98 One 1966 opinion exclaimed that “[i]t has been
said that” [section 402A] was “one of the most spectacular develop
ments of tort law in this century.”99 Surely, it is also fairly said that
section 402A has been the most influential provision of any Re
statement of the Law.100
C. 1971-1974 Amendments to the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Against the backdrop of clear inadequacies in Massachusetts
negligence and warranty law illuminated by Necktas, and a power
ful movement in academia and in the courts advocating a strict lia
bility regime for defective products, it was all but inevitable that
Massachusetts would revamp its products liability law. Massachu
setts chose to make these changes legislatively by amending its ver
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code’s implied warranty of
merchantability.101
The most significant change was the elimination of the privity
requirement, a legislative action that was the equivalent of New
95. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99-102 (N.J. 1960).
96. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901-02 (Cal. 1963);
Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2009).
97. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955,
977 (2007); see Prosser, supra note 46, at 1138.
98. See William A. Worthington, The “Citadel” Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and
the Policy of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 242 n.79 (1995) (describing “race” to adopt
section 402A and citing cases).
99. Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (citation omitted).
100. Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Prod
ucts Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (noting that section 402A has been cited in
over three thousand judicial opinions).
101. See Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978) (describing
amendments to the implied warranty of merchantability to make it equivalent to section
402A); Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 1215, 1216-18 (Mass. 1977) (discussing
history of applicable Massachusetts legislative amendments).
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Jersey’s Henningsen decision.102 The legislature also amended the
wrongful death statute to allow for recovery in warranty actions.103
Together, these two amendments had the effect of fixing the injus
tices identified in Necktas.104 The amendments also extended im
plied warranty protection beyond sales transactions to commercial
leases.105 The statute of limitations period was changed to three
years, which only begins to run upon the occurrence of the injury or
damage sustained by the plaintiff, rather than upon the sale of the
product.106 The old rule allowed claims to be extinguished before
the plaintiff was injured and could have sued.107 The legislature
gave teeth to these changes by forbidding, and in some cases, limit
ing the extent to which these protections could be disclaimed or
excluded by contract.108
Together, these various legislative enactments “jettisoned
many of the doctrinal encumbrances of the law of sales and what
remains is a very different theory of recovery from that traditionally
associated with the sale of goods.”109 As important as these amend
ments were, they were limited to removing what may be termed
“wooden rules” that automatically and somewhat arbitrarily fore
closed recovery. In short, they were directed to the more limited
set of issues that Massachusetts courts had grappled with during the
pre-modern era. The amendments addressed who could sue, who
could be sued, and what kinds of products would be subject to the
implied warranty of merchantability.110 They established some
102. See Hoffman, 364 N.E.2d at 1216 (discussing the elimination of privity re
quirement); supra section I.B.
103. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 n.4 (Mass. 1978).
104. See id. (noting the result in Necktas and the amendment to the wrongful
death statute); Swartz, 378 N.E.2d at 63 (noting the result in Necktas and the elimina
tion of the privity requirement).
105. See Swartz, 378 N.E.2d at 63 (amended section 2-318 applies to commercial
leases).
106. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2008).
107. See Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. 1978)
(describing the effect of the old statute of limitations for implied warranty actions). In
Cannon, the plaintiff brought his action shortly before the statute was amended, two
years after he was injured and nine years after the sale and manufacture of the product.
Id. at 583. The three year statute of limitations was held not to bar the negligence claim
because it accrued at the time of the injury. Id. at 584. The warranty claim, however,
was barred because the plaintiff could not take advantage of the amended section 2-318
and its new accrual rule. Id. at 584 n.3.
108. See ch. 106, § 2-316A.
109. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
110. See ch. 106, § 2-318 (defining classes of plaintiffs and defendants); ch. 106,
§ 2-316(5) (excluding certain products from implied warranty of merchantability); see
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helpful procedural rules for regulating the relationship between
manufacturer, seller, and consumer, and they expanded the kinds of
damages that could be sought.111 These basic issues were also at
the heart of the strict liability movement in other states.112 Prosser,
the acolyte of strict liability, concentrated his energies on the aboli
tion of privity and the extension of strict liability from foods to
other products.113 Tellingly, section 402A finds it necessary to ad
dress the kinds of products subject to the new rule, and then to list a
number of them, product by product.114
Left undone by the Massachusetts legislative amendments and
by section 402A was the more nuanced work of elaborating on the
duties owed by manufacturers and sellers. Duties relating to the
design of products were not addressed at all in either the Massachu
setts laws or in section 402A. These omissions stem from the fact
that strict products liability, in its infancy, was concerned with man
ufacturing defect cases such as Necktas, or cases involving explod
ing bottles.115 The defectiveness of the product in these situations
was without question.116
Thus when the Supreme Judicial Court formulated its declara
tion that “[t]he Legislature has made the Massachusetts law of war
ranty congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed
also Hoffman v. Howmedica, 364 N.E.2d 1215, 1216-18 (Mass. 1977) (discussing
amendments).
111. Ch. 106, §§ 2-316 to -316A (regulating extent to which seller may disclaim
warranties); ch. 106, § 2-318 (establishing statute of limitations and eliminating notice
defense); see also Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969 n.4 (noting amendment of statute to allow for
wrongful death for a breach of warranty).
112. See Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and
Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK L. REV. 807, 815 (2009).
113. See generally Prosser, supra note 46, at 1110-14 (arguing for extension of
strict liability to products beyond food).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965).
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt. (1998).
“The major thrust of § 402A was to eliminate privity so that a user or consumer, with
out having to establish negligence, could bring an action against a manufacturer, as well
as against any other member of a distribution chain that had sold a product containing a
manufacturing defect.” Id.
116. See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970. The Supreme Judicial Court recognized how
the issue of merchantability was a much clearer question when the product involved a
manufacturing defect, by saying:
If this were a case involving a manufacturing defect, the jury might simply
compare the propensities of the product as sold with those which the product’s
designer intended it to have and thereby reach a judgment as to whether the
deviation from the design rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and
therefore unfit for its ordinary purposes.
Id.
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in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965),”117 it was a true
statement in that the legislature had eliminated privity as a defense
and had established strict liability for products that were not of
merchantable quality. Products that failed because they departed
from the intended design and were not what they purported to be,
i.e., products with manufacturing flaws, were plainly not of mer
chantable quality when those flaws caused injury.118 It was left to
Massachusetts courts to establish standards that would govern lia
bility in design and warning cases, which have come to dominate
modern products liability litigation.119 The extent to which the dec
laration about the congruency of section 402A and the Massachu
setts implied warranty of merchantability, which came to be a
mantra in Massachusetts products liability law, remained true de
pended on future decisions of Massachusetts courts and on the
evolving meaning of section 402A, as it became infused with the
decisions of the many courts which had adopted it.
D. 1975-78: First Attempts to Create the Modern Doctrine
The new implied warranty cause of action did not, by any
means, abolish or make redundant the traditional negligence suit.
Throughout the modern era, negligence and implied warranty have
become intertwined as the two claims have been defined in refer
ence to each other and in contrast to each other. Massachusetts
courts have used negligence principles and precedent to define and
expand the duties owed to the consumer under the implied war
ranty of merchantability.120 But as Massachusetts courts began
their construction of the modern doctrine, even the old negligence
cases were of limited value as the courts began to confront issues
that had never been litigated in Massachusetts before.121 A reader
of the opinions from the first part of the modern era will notice how
117.
118.

Id. at 969.
See id. at 969-70; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(a) cmt. c.
119. By contrast, issues involving manufacturing defects have scarcely troubled
modern courts. The huge litigation over exploding bottles in the pre-modern era, for
example, has become a virtual nullity. A search of Massachusetts cases since 1975
reveals just a single published decision dealing with a claim of personal injury from a
defective bottle. See Gleasons v. Source Perrier, 553 N.E.2d 544, 545-46 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1990); cf Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Mass. 1959)
(canvassing numerous cases).
120. See, e.g., Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (describing design defect inquiry under
implied warranty of merchantability as essentially the same as negligence inquiry).
121. See id. (citing decisions from other jurisdictions rather than older Massachu
setts negligence cases).
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little precedent is cited and how that precedent provides only infer
ential, rather than direct, support.122 Massachusetts courts were
faced with a nearly blank canvas.
1. Constructing a Methodology for the Judicial Review of
Product Designs
Coinciding with the amendments to the implied warranty of
merchantability were bold attempts by plaintiffs’ lawyers during the
1970s to challenge the designs of products.123 Massachusetts courts
were thus forced, almost all at once, to resolve a number of conten
tious and fundamental issues that were, at their root, policy judg
ments about the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
The first attempt to deal in a comprehensive way with design de
fects came in Back v. Wickes Corp.,124 a case that later courts have
recognized as establishing some of the important tenets of the mod
ern doctrine by ritual citation of the decision.125 Back acknowl
edged that reviewing a product’s design was a very different inquiry
than had been conducted for manufacturing defects.126 In Back,
the plaintiffs challenged the placement of the fuel tank on a motor
home, contending that putting the tank outside the frame made it
more vulnerable to puncture.127 The court saw this as a question of
whether the manufacturer’s “conscious design choices . . . [had] ren
dered the product unreasonably dangerous . . . [and] unfit for high
way travel.”128 This was a key insight, and it followed from the
manufacturer’s unrepentant contentions that the motor home was
built exactly how it should have been, and that the vehicle con
formed to industry safety standards.129 Unlike in Leblanc and
Necktas, where the motor vehicles had plainly failed because they
did not conform to their intended designs, the motor home failed,
in the plaintiffs’ view, precisely because it did conform to the in
tended design.130
122. Id.
123. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1064
(2009) [hereinafter Triumph of Risk-Utility] (noting how design cases began to reach
juries in great numbers in 1970s).
124. Back, 378 N.E.2d 964.
125. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2004)
(citing Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970).
126. Back, 387 N.E.2d at 970.
127. Id. at 967.
128. Id. at 970.
129. Id. at 967-68.
130. Id. (explaining plaintiff’s theory of vehicle’s design deficiencies).
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After recognizing that a case alleging unreasonable, conscious
design choices “present[ed] a more difficult jury question” than a
case involving a manufacturing defect, Back set forth, for the first
time in Massachusetts law, factors a jury should consider in evaluat
ing the adequacy of a product’s design: (1) “gravity of the danger
posed by the” design; (2) “likelihood” of the danger occurring; (3)
“mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design”; (4) “cost of an
improved design”; and (5) drawbacks of an alternative design “to
the product and to the consumer.”131 These factors can be seen as
drawing from the classic mathematical negligence test postulated by
Judge Learned Hand in the well known decision of United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.: B < PL.132 In that formulation, “L” repre
sented the amount of the loss, and “P” represented the probability
it would occur.133 If “B,” the burden of avoiding that loss, is less
than “P” multiplied times “L,” then it would be negligent for an
actor not to incur the costs of avoiding the loss.134 The enumerated
Back factors suggest a similar comparison of the costs of accidents
caused by a design with the costs of avoiding those accidents. The
first two factors represent the “L” and the “P” from Hand’s test,
and the final three factors represent aspects of “B,” the accident
avoidance costs through a different design. This balancing process
came to be known as the risk-utility test.135
These factors were a needed elaboration on the general “rea
sonable care” negligence standard. Just three years earlier, in doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the
viability of a negligent design theory in a case involving a commer
cial ironing machine.136 In doCanto, there was no expert testimony
introduced about an alternative design that could have prevented
the plaintiff’s hand from being pulled under the ironer.137 There
was, on the other hand, evidence about pre-accident and post-acci
dent safety improvements that were admitted for the purpose of
showing the manufacturer’s knowledge of the risk and the feasibil
131. Id. at 970.
132. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the risk-utility factors in Back v. Wickes Corp. “requires an inquiry essen
tially the same as the negligence inquiry”), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215
(1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
136. doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 876-79 (Mass. 1975).
137. Id. at 877.
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ity of making those improvements to the product.138 This evidence,
along with the fact that the employee who designed the product
knew about the risk, was enough to submit the negligent design
claim to the jury.139 As significant as it was to subject a manufac
turer’s design choices to judicial review, doCanto did not see its
decision as a matter of public policy, but rather as another permuta
tion of longstanding negligence principles.140
While the enumerated Back factors made design review more
concrete, they were not an exclusive list, and Back did not indicate
how they would be weighed against each other or against
unenumerated factors. More crucially, it was not clear that a safer
alternative design was essential to showing that the product was de
fectively designed. In Smith v. Ariens Co., decided on the same day
as Back, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the plaintiff’s judgment
based on the negligent design of a snowmobile that had sharp metal
protrusions on a handle bar.141 When the plaintiff became involved
in a collision, her face struck the protrusions, and she suffered seri
ous injuries.142 Smith did not balance the Back factors, and it did
not address the fact that the plaintiff had not introduced evidence
of an alternative design.143 Six months after Back and Smith, Uloth
v. City Tank Corp., hinted that a safer alternative design was a nec
138. Id. at 876-77.
139. Id. at 877.
140. Id. The court saw design review as just another species of negligence. In
support, it cited two negligent failure to warn cases, Carter v. Yarkley & Co., 64 N.E.2d
693 (Mass. 1946), and Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Weave Corp., 173 N.E.2d 84 (Mass.
1961), which were from the pre-modern era and the court saw no need to explain how
those precedents applied in a negligent design case.
141. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 955-57 (Mass. 1978).
142. Id. at 955.
143. Id. at 957-58. The manufacturer in Smith took aim at the fact that the plain
tiff had “not introduce[d] any expert testimony tending to show that the snowmobile
was negligently designed.” Id. at 957. As the court held in doCanto, expert testimony
was not essential where jurors using their lay knowledge could conclude that the design
presents unreasonable risks of injury. Id.; doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 877. While the de
sign feature in Smith was not very complicated, and it did seem to present needless
dangers, doCanto could have been distinguished in that there was other evidence of
alternative designs that were technologically feasible and practical; this evidence, while
not in the form of expert testimony, came in the form of pre-accident and post-accident
improvements. Id. at 875-76. Smith found there was sufficient evidence of negligent
design, noting “the absence of guards to cover [the protrusions].” Id. at 958. Yet, the
jury apparently had no evidence about how the presence of guards would have been
accommodated in the layout and design of the snowmobile, how it would have impacted
the operation or handling of the machine, or how it would have increased the cost of
the product. Id. at 957-58. Persuasive evidence probably could have been introduced
on these issues, but without it, the jury’s evaluation of the snowmobile’s design must
have been somewhat speculative.
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essary element of the plaintiff’s proof but did not say so explic
itly.144 In Uloth, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a plaintiff’s
design defect claim in part by distinguishing its decision in Schaeffer
v. General Motors Corp.,145 which held that the plaintiff had not
presented enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the product
contained a design defect.146 Uloth distinguished Schaeffer by
pointing out that “Schaeffer did not offer proof that the [part] could
have been designed to perform the same function in a safer fash
ion.”147 In contrast, the plaintiff in Uloth showed evidence of alter
native designs that would have reduced the danger without
significantly reducing efficiency.148 Later in the Uloth opinion, the
court stated that “there is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show
an available design modification which would reduce the risk with
out undue cost or interference with the performance of the
machinery.”149
Despite these hints, the necessity of a safer alternative design
remained a mystery. Back, by its formulation, was an open-ended,
multi-factor test which attempted to retain a maximum of flexibility
as Massachusetts courts developed the parameters of the new doc
trine.150 The plaintiffs in Back had, in fact, introduced evidence of
alternative designs.151 The plaintiff in Smith had not, and the court
upheld the claim nonetheless.152 In reality, the Supreme Judicial
Court seems not to have appreciated the importance of requiring,
or deciding not to require, proof of an alternative design. After all,
Back’s open-ended risk-utility test was derived from the law in
other jurisdictions,153 and it was becoming the majority rule in de
sign cases.154 Courts in those other jurisdictions,155 and even schol
ars in the field,156 did not see the need to make the fine point of
144. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978).
145. Id. at 1191 (discussing Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062,
1064 (Mass. 1977)).
146. Schaeffer, 360 N.E.2d at 1064.
147. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1191.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1193.
150. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978).
151. Id. at 967.
152. See Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 954-58 (Mass. 1978).
153. See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (citing cases from other jurisdictions).
154. See John H. Chun, Note, The New Citadel: A Reasonably Designed Products
Liability Restatement, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1654, 1658 (1994).
155. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Bowman v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
156. See W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39
AM. U. L. REV. 573, 574, 580 (1990) (risk-utility test developed by Dean Wade; criticiz
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whether a safer alternative design was simply a factor, or an essen
tial factor. Moreover, these early modern era cases in Massachu
setts did not squarely present the question. Even in Smith, which
allowed recovery without evidence of an alternative design, the de
fendant appears not to have argued the point.157 Later cases
outside of Massachusetts and in Massachusetts made it necessary to
face this issue head-on.158 The Supreme Judicial Court can be for
given then for creating this ambiguity in its initial foray into design
defect cases. It is more perplexing that this ambiguity continues in
Massachusetts over thirty years later.
2. Breaking Away from the Hidden Danger Paradigm
As this Article has previously explained, Massachusetts prod
ucts liability law in the pre-modern period was primarily concerned
with hidden dangers to the consumer. The three seminal design
cases decided in 1978, Uloth, Smith, and Back, dealt with the partic
ular problems that patent dangers pose. They did away with the
hidden danger paradigm and reached decisions that promoted con
sumer protection in practical, cost-efficient ways.
Uloth has become a classic illustration of the duty to design
around patent risks, where the design changes can be made at rea
sonable cost.159 At the time it was decided, that duty was far from
established, and certainly not in Massachusetts.160 In Uloth, the
plaintiff was working on a garbage truck, which was equipped with
a rear step on which the workmen rode between stops.161 The
plaintiff hopped onto the step and slipped into the trash compaction
area, where his foot was severed by a descending blade.162 Evi
dence of several alternative designs was presented at trial, including
side steps for the workers, which would have reduced the danger
ing Wade’s risk-utility factors as “[a] list of concerns,” not a liability test (citing John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973))).
157. See Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 954-59.
158. See discussion infra Parts II.C and III.D.
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l, illus. 14
(1998) (illustration patterned from facts of Uloth).
160. Uloth noted that one of the leading patent danger cases, Campo v. Scofield,
95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), had just recently been overruled. Uloth v. City Tank Corp.,
384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 n.5 (Mass. 1978); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 2 reporters’ note to cmt. d (canvassing cases rejecting patent danger
rule). Some jurisdictions retain the patent danger rule. Id.
161. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1190-91.
162. Id. at 1191.
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with little impact on the efficiency of the machine.163 The manufac
turers argued, as a general matter, that they only had a duty to warn
of dangers attendant in their product.164 Of course, the danger of
the descending blade was obvious, which meant that they had no
duty at all, since there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers.165
Uloth held, in effect, that a warning (or the obviousness of a danger
which serves as a warning) may not substitute for a faulty design.166
Uloth rejected the patent danger rule, which held that users of
a product should bear any risks that were obvious.167 The rule held
sway in most jurisdictions until the 1970s, but had never been ex
plicitly announced in Massachusetts.168 In Uloth, the court rea
soned that products liability “law . . . ‘ought to discourage misdesign
rather than encouraging it in its obvious form.’”169 By departing
from the hidden danger paradigm, Uloth made practical judgments
about the world we live in. It was unabashed social policy-making,
rather than the mythical process of “finding” the law by tracing the
logical consequences of precedent. It was not lost on the Uloth
court that the plaintiff was a forty-four year old man working as a
general laborer for the town of Amesbury, that he had a learning
disability, that he had little experience working on the garbage
truck, and that he had received little training or instruction for the
job he was doing.170 With this surely in mind, the court observed
that “a user may not have a real alternative to using a dangerous
product, as where a worker must either work on a dangerous ma
chine or leave his job.”171 Uloth also found that “warning[s] [were]
not effective in eliminating injuries due to instinctual reactions, mo
mentary inadvertence, or forgetfulness on the part of a worker.”172
The reason for “safety devices,” after all, “is to guard against such
foreseeable situations.”173 The Supreme Judicial Court thus
showed a tolerance for human frailties, and it recognized that mo
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 1191-92.
Id.
Id. at 1192-93.
Id.
JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 169-70 (5th ed. 2004).
169. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193 (quoting Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476
P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. App. 1970)).
170. Id. at 1190, 1193.
171. Id. at 1192.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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mentary, foreseeable lapses in the execution of a task are different
from careless or reckless conduct.174
Smith and Back should also be seen as movement away from
the hidden danger paradigm. The hidden danger paradigm of the
pre-modern era was premised, in part, on the notion that the con
sumer did not receive what he bargained for.175 Put differently, the
product had disappointed consumer expectations through a manu
facturing defect,176 or because the lack of a warning made the user
think the product was safer than it was. Back explicitly noted that
“reasonable consumer expectations” are a legitimate part of deter
mining whether it is “fit for [its] ordinary purposes” under the im
plied warranty of merchantability.177 Smith and Back did not make
those consumer expectations, or consumer choices, dispositive.178
After all, the metal protrusions on the handle bar of the snowmo
bile in Smith should have been obvious to any user.179 The pur
chaser of the snowmobile chose that snowmobile among others on
the market, and presumably could have bought another machine
without that needless risk. The design error of the motor home in
Back, the unwise placement of the fuel tank,180 was surely less obvi
ous, but it certainly was no secret either. A careful consumer might
have inspected the layout of the motor home and could have
bought something else without the same risk. It is even possible
that the purchasers of the snowmobile and the motor home bought
those models precisely because they were cheaper, perhaps because
the manufacturers had invested less safety. In Smith and Back,
these consumer choices were beside the point where the products
presented risks that could have been avoided at a reasonable cost.
Thus, the focus of Massachusetts products liability law was shifting
away from whether the consumer had “no notice”181 of the prod
uct’s danger, to whether that danger, as a matter of social policy,
should be eliminated.
174. Id. at 1192 n.6.
175. See Farley v. Edward Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 640-42 (Mass. 1930) (im
posing liability where consumer product used as intended and without any warnings
caused injury to consumer, emphasizing unknown quality of risk to consumer).
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998).
177. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978).
178. See id. (noting fitness “depend[s] largely, although not exclusively, on rea
sonable consumer expectations”).
179. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957 (noting location of protrusions).
180. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 967 (location of gas tank outside the perimeter of the
chassis frame).
181. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491 (Mass. 1915).
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3. Breaking Away from the Intended Use Paradigm
As was discussed in Parts I.A and I.B, cases in the pre-modern
era involved consumers using products as the manufacturer had in
tended. For example, in Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,
the injured plaintiff was using the hair product in exactly the way
that the manufacturer had directed in the instructions to the prod
uct.182 The cases of the pre-modern era tended not to deal with
situations where a plaintiff had used a product in ways that the
manufacturer had not explicitly intended, or where the product had
been subjected to stresses the manufacturer had not intended. At
the beginning of the modern era, Massachusetts courts were
presented with cases that raised the question of whether manufac
turers and sellers could be held liable where a defective product
caused injury in foreseeable, but unintended situations. At stake
was whether the manufacturer, or the courts using some indepen
dent standard, would decide whether a product was defectively
designed.
Two of the first cases of the modern period held out hope to
manufacturers that it would be their standards, i.e., the manufac
turer’s intended uses of the product, that would decide whether a
product contained a design defect. Schaeffer v. General Motors
Corp. upheld a directed verdict for a manufacturer where an auto
mobile mechanism, alleged by plaintiff to be defectively designed,
had “adequately performed the functions for which it was designed
and manufactured.”183 The court went on to say that a jury ques
tion would have presented “if there were evidence indicating that
the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the differential’s failure to per
form its intended function, but there was no such evidence.”184
Missing was any attempt to second guess the manufacturer’s design
choices since the mechanism had done what the manufacturer had
intended it to do. Schaeffer was unwilling to undertake this inquiry
despite there being, by its own admission, “considerable evidence
. . . that the . . . [mechanism] might reduce safety and stability in
certain road conditions.”185 The court apparently thought it would
be inappropriate, for example, for a jury to delve into whether the
mechanism, designed to improve safety in certain situations, might
have reduced the vehicle’s overall safety, thereby inviting the jury
182.
183.
184.
185.

Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,173 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Mass. 1961).
See Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Mass. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 1064-65.
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to decide that the manufacturer had been unreasonable in its design
choices.186 Schaeffer cited as support doCanto v. Ametek, Inc.,187
which did not explicitly adopt the intended use paradigm, but doCanto was consistent with the result reached in Schaeffer.188 In doCanto, the product’s improper design had caused it to fail to
perform a function that the manufacturer had affirmatively prom
ised that it would perform.189
These decisions show that it was not inevitable that Massachu
setts courts and juries would conduct their own cost/benefit analy
ses of manufacturer’s design choices. Until the mid-1970s, courts
around the country had been unwilling to impose liability where the
product performed exactly in the way it was intended to perform.190
It was, after all, possible for Massachusetts courts to have limited
recovery to a narrow category of “self-defeating” design cases in
which the product’s deficiency is much like a manufacturing defect
because it fails to perform its “manifestly intended function.”191
These cases stem from “inadvertent design errors,” mistakes made
by the product designers that “if [the product designers] could have
recaptured [the product] before it had hit the market and started
hurting people, [they would] have done so. They are designs about
which there is simply no argument that they may be okay.”192
These cases are relatively rare, and it appears that they have not
often made their way into the published decisions of Massachusetts

186. Id.
187. Id. at 1064 (citing doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1975)).
188. doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 875-80.
189. Id. at 877.
190. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 484
(1990) (“[C]ourts generally were reluctant, until the mid-1970s, to impose liability for
harm caused by product designs that performed exactly as they were intended to per
form. For example, when a driver of an automobile inadvertently crashed into a tree,
courts traditionally refused to consider seriously the argument that the vehicle should
have been designed to prevent or reduce injury to its occupants. Notwithstanding pre
dictions of doom from some quarters, courts gradually overcame their reluctance and
by the late 1970s and the early 1980s they routinely imposed liability for harm caused by
manufacturer’s conscious design choices.”).
191. Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1064.
192. James A. Henderson, Jr., A Discussion and a Defense of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 19 (1998); see James
A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1547-52 (1973) [hereinafter Conscious
Design Choices] (explanation of “inadvertent design errors”).
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courts,193 but in other jurisdictions, courts were prepared, even
prior to the publication of section 402A, to impose liability where
products would “collapse during normal use because of inadver
tently designed-in weaknesses.”194 For example, if brakes were de
signed such that they failed unexpectedly, the argument for liability
was unassailable.195 Limiting design review to these “inadvertent
design error” cases would not have taxed the competence of courts
to adjudicate these disputes since the matter of determining
whether the product failed during its intended use is a question of
engineering and mathematics, not value judgments about the ap
propriate level of safety.196 In 1973, one influential scholar and law
professor from Massachusetts argued against extending judicial re
view beyond the inadvertent design error cases, calling the review
of conscious design choices “a suicide mission” for courts.197
And yet, Smith and Back, just a year after Schaeffer, under
took the difficult task of assessing the reasonableness of manufac
turers’ design choices. In Smith, the defendant argued that a
product need only be fit for its intended purpose, and that intended
purpose did not include participation in collisions.198 After all, no
manufacturer intends for its products to become involved in acci
dents. The defendant argued that it owed no duty to design its
product in a way that would help protect the user in a collision.199
193. But see Carey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583, 588 (Mass. 1979) (not
ing that design defects alleged by plaintiff were based on improper engineering
practice).
194. Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1551.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1552 (“In effect, the intended design serves as a standard with which to
assess (and almost automatically condemn) the actual design.”). See also Carey, in
which the proof advanced by plaintiff was the testimony of a mechanical engineer about
proper engineering practice. Carey, 387 N.E.2d at 585-88. There was no need to en
gage in balancing the costs and benefits of the manufacturer’s design choices through
the Back factors. Indeed, the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert about the inadvisability
of using thin plastic in a small, but essential, automobile part could hardly be disputed
by the manufacturer, which had issued a recall for the part. Id. at 588. This illustrates
the true test for distinguishing an inadvertent design error case from a conscious choice
design case: if the designer could have turned back time and changed the design deci
sion, would he have done so? In an inadvertent design error case, the designer surely
would do so. In a conscious design case, the designer would stand by the judgment calls
he made in balancing safety with other factors. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767
F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (illustrating an inadvertent design error case where an
airplane crashed into mountain because aeronautical chart, deemed to be a “product,”
was inaccurate).
197. Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1578.
198. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 956-57 (Mass. 1978).
199. Id.

R
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The defendants in Back made essentially the same argument,
except that they maintained that a motor home crashing into a
highway railing was “an extraordinary” use, or misuse, of the prod
uct.200 In either formulation, a departure from the intended use of
the product would work to completely cut off liability before any of
the manufacturer’s design decisions were considered. The Supreme
Judicial Court opted to break away from the intended use para
digm, and in so doing, insisted that the proper question was the
reasonable foreseeability of the use.201
Back held that “a manufacturer must anticipate the environ
ment in which its product will be used, and it must design against
the reasonably foreseeable risks attending the product’s use in that
setting.”202 In both Smith, a case involving a snowmobile accident,
and Back, a case about a highway accident involving a motor home,
the risks from an accident were found to be sufficiently foreseeable
that the designer had a duty to minimize the likelihood of injury in
the event of a crash.203 Crashworthiness and foreseeability were
not absolute concepts. The designer had no duty to anticipate “bi
zarre, unforeseeable accidents,”204 and it needed only to prevent
the user from being subjected “to unreasonable risks”205 in a colli
sion. The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that it was wading
into matters of social policy, noting that the “major argument”
against extending tort liability to crashworthiness cases was that the
legislature should make decisions about design standards.206 The
court decided it would intervene, at least temporarily, until the leg
islature acted.207
Defendants made another stab at reviving the intended use/
intended function paradigm a year later in Uloth.208 After all, the
garbage truck had performed “precisely as intended,” and there
fore, according to the manufacturers, could not have been negli
gently designed.209 The Supreme Judicial Court brushed aside the
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Back v. Wickes Co., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978).
Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 484.
Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 957; Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969-70.
Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 957.
Id.
Id.
Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
Id. at 1191.

R
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defendants’ invocation of Schaeffer,210 and by then it was confident
enough to state that “the focus in design negligence cases is not on
how the product is meant to function, but on whether the product is
designed with reasonable care to eliminate avoidable dangers.”211
In other words, the manufacturer’s intended function of the product
had gone from being dispositive to being almost beside the point.
The question, quite simply, was how the product ought to function,
as determined by courts and juries.
4. The Interplay Between Warranty and Negligence and the
Importance of Doctrinal Labels
The early cases of the modern era attempted to stake out dif
ferences between implied warranty and negligence liability, but the
congruity between the two theories was more impressive than the
distinctions. Only later did Massachusetts courts become preoccu
pied by the doctrinal labels, with rather unfortunate results, as this
Article argues in Parts II and III. Smith, Uloth, doCanto, and
Schaeffer were all negligence cases.212 Back was an implied war
ranty case, but it conceded that a jury reviewing the manufacturer’s
conscious design choices under the implied warranty of
merchantability “must weigh competing factors much as they would
in determining the fault of the defendant in a negligence case.”213
In other words, the functional analysis for warranty and negligence
was the same. The real story then was that the Supreme Judicial
Court had affected a sea change in Massachusetts products liability
law through changes to the common law of negligence, not because
the implied warranty of merchantability had enlarged consumer
protection. Had that been the lesson of these early modern prod
ucts liability cases, the development of the implied warranty of
merchantability and of negligence theory would have proceeded
more or less in tandem. There would have been no need to make
210. Id. Uloth’s attempt to distinguish Schaeffer is not persuasive. Rather than
announcing that “intended function” was no longer the touchstone for design review,
and thereby clearly relegating Schaeffer to the ash heap, Uloth claimed that the plaintiff
failed in Schaeffer because he had failed to provide proof of a safer alternative design.
Id. There is nothing in Schaeffer to indicate that the court was remotely interested in
weighing the costs and benefits of a different version of the product. The issue began
and ended with the fact that the allegedly defective automobile part had done what it
was designed to do. Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Mass.
1977). There is no credible way to reconcile Schaeffer and Uloth.
211. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1191.
212. See supra Parts I.D.1, I.D.2, and I.D.3.
213. Back v. Wickes Co., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978).
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pained attempts to distinguish the old negligence cause of action
from its supposedly more progressive brethren, the implied war
ranty of merchantability. Instead, Back’s attempts in dicta to ex
plain the differences between the two theories became maxims
upon which future cases would founder.
These maxims, destined to be repeated and puzzled over, are
as follows:
1. The Strict Liability Maxim: The amendments to the im
plied warranty of merchantability “[had] transformed [it] into a
remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict lia
bility theory of recovery that has been adopted by a great
many other jurisdictions.”214
2. The 402A Maxim: “Massachusetts law of warranty [is] con
gruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).”215 As a result,
strict liability cases in other jurisdictions are a useful guide to
interpreting the implied warrant of merchantability.216
3. The Product, Not Conduct Maxim: Warranty focuses on
the product’s characteristics, not the defendant’s conduct, as
negligence does.217
From these maxims, the strict liability conundrum was born.
As this Article has previously argued, both section 402A of the Re
statement (Second) of Torts and the amendments to the Massachu
setts implied warranty of merchantability, as they were initially
conceived, had the similar, and comparatively modest, goals of
abolishing the privity rule, removing various encumbrances from
the law of sales, and extending strict liability to manufacturing de
fects.218 Later, section 402A and the Massachusetts implied war
ranty of merchantability came to be interpreted as extending strict
liability to design and warning cases.219 The remainder of this Arti
cle will explore how Massachusetts courts have tried, in many cases
with unsatisfactory results, to come to terms with the idea of strict
liability. Before doing so, it is important to observe that Back, as it
was making the statements that would become inflexible maxims,
was hardly attempting to apply liability without fault on its facts.
Back insisted that it was reasonable foreseeability, in the classic
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 968.
Id. at 969.
Id.
Id. at 970.
See supra Part I.A.
See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1062-63.
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negligence formulation, that defined the duty to be owed.220 The
duty to design a crashworthy vehicle was a rule of reason, and no
vehicle would be required to be “collision-proof.”221 Even as it was
making the logically inconsistent statement that the focus should be
on the product, not the defendant conduct, where the alleged fault
in the product lay in the defendant’s conscious design choices (i.e.,
the defendant’s conduct), Back hastened to add that “the nature of
the decision is essentially the same.”222
This important qualifier would be forgotten by some Massa
chusetts courts. The criticisms, which follow in this Article, are crit
icisms directed at the strange and circuitous voyage taken by
Massachusetts courts in subsequent years where they became
overly interested in adherence to these maxims and to doctrinal la
bels. These criticisms are not directed at Back or at the other early
landmark cases of the modern period, which did not display doctri
nal rigidity but instead did away with it. The fault lies not in Back
but in the misbegotten interpretations of its maxims.
II. STRICT LIABILITY BECOMES

A

MUDDLE: 1983

TO

1992

The second (or middle) part of the modern era of Massachu
setts products liability law saw the creation of two entirely avoida
ble controversies: the unreasonable use defense, and the hindsight
test for warning claims. It also saw the ambiguity over the necessity
of a safer alternative design present itself in more concrete ways,
yet the ambiguity remained (and still remains) unresolved. These
issues led to incoherence and confusion in Massachusetts products
liability law, and they have unnaturally limited or foreclosed recov
ery to plaintiffs injured by defective products. During this time,
Massachusetts courts became more concerned with delineating the
theoretical distinctions between negligence and warranty (i.e., strict
liability) and staying true to the maxims outlined in Part I.D.4 than
shaping the law in a practical way to promote an optimal level of
consumer protection.

220. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969; see Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100
(N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed . . . .”).
221. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
222. Id. at 970.
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A. The Lamentable “Unreasonable Use” Defense
The middle part of the modern era began with the Supreme
Judicial Court’s 1983 decision in Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.,223 which spawned the “unreasonable use” or “Correia” de
fense.224 The case was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court as a
set of certified questions from federal court having to do with the
alleged negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s em
ployer.225 The plaintiff’s decedent was driving his employer’s trac
tor-trailer loaded with steel plates when one of the tires blew out,
causing an accident that led to the death of the employee.226 One
of the questions asked was whether contributory or comparative
negligence could be a partial or complete defense to an implied
warranty of merchantability claim.227 Correia concluded that the
Massachusetts comparative negligence statute did not “literally ap
ply,” since the warranty claim was essentially strict liability in tort,
not negligence.228 It invoked the Strict Liability Maxim, the 402A
Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct Maxim to sharply contrast
strict liability from negligence.229 Calling upon comment c to sec
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court de
scribed strict liability in terms of social justice, invoking the
“‘special responsibility’” of “‘reputable sellers [to] stand behind
their goods.’”230 “‘[P]ublic policy demand[ed]’” strict liability.231
This theory of liability was further premised upon the “‘right[s]’” of
the public, and the notion that the consumer is “‘entitled to the
maximum of protection’” from those who could “‘afford it.’”232
This description logically suggested an uncompromising standard
once the rights and entitlements of the powerless public were ar
rayed against powerful sellers and manufacturers. The populist
tone and absolute language were more typical of constitutional
223. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983).
224. The confusion about this defense, described below, has prompted courts to
eschew the more descriptive unreasonable use moniker in favor of simply “Correia.”
See Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 323 (Mass. 2006) (analyzing the
“Correia” defense). This Article will use both terms but will take care to distinguish
this defense from other, closely related concepts.
225. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1033.
226. Id. at 1034.
227. Id. at 1039.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1039-40.
230. Id. at 1040 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c
(1965)).
231. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c).
232. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c).
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law,233 with its emphasis on indefeasible rights, than traditionally
flexible tort doctrines. Strict liability, Correia maintained, imposed
a duty “unknown in the law of negligence,” which is not fulfilled
even upon the exercise of all reasonable care.234
In propounding this theory of strict liability, Correia never
paused to consider the theory of defect the plaintiff alleged.235 It is
unclear whether the plaintiff had claimed that the tire contained a
manufacturing defect that caused the blowout, or whether the tire
contained a design defect that caused the tire to fail prematurely
under a load that it should have handled.236 The Supreme Judicial
Court had clearly recognized the difference between manufacturing
and design defects in cases like Back and Smith. Those decisions
had held that courts should apply a rule of reason for products al
leged to be defectively designed.237 After all, no tire can be ex
pected to last forever, nor can it handle an unlimited amount of
weight; the circumstances of the product failure had to be reckoned
with. By not considering or addressing the distinction between
manufacturing and design defects, Correia began to set in cement
the idea that strict liability applied in all types of products liability
cases. This idea would lead to unfortunate, and perhaps unin
tended, consequences.
Having expressed the strict liability rhetoric, Correia felt com
pelled to invent a restriction on this expansive theory of recovery.
It announced, without citation to authority, that “[w]hen a user un
reasonably proceeds to use a product which he knows to be defec
tive and dangerous, he violates that duty [to act reasonably] and
relinquishes the protection of the law.”238 In a stroke, the court
created a complete defense to “balance[ ]” what it imagined was a
very robust theory of liability.239 The “unreasonabl[e] use[ ]” of the
product was thought to be the sole “proximate cause of [the plain
tiff’s] injuries as a matter of law,” which would appropriately deny
233. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (First Amendment rights not to be balanced against other interests).
234. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040.
235. Id. at 1040-41 (describing liability under implied warranty of merchantability
without analyzing type of defect alleged by plaintiff).
236. Id. at 1034.
237. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (emphasizing that
“warranty liability is not absolute liability” and there is no duty to make vehicle “colli
sion-proof”); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Mass. 1978) (adopting reasona
ble care standard).
238. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040.
239. Id.
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all recovery.240 The doctrinal inconsistencies in this new defense
should have been readily apparent. First, it looked remarkably sim
ilar to the assumption of risk defense abolished by the Massachu
setts legislature.241 Correia could avoid the assumption of risk bar
since it only applied to negligence, which it insisted was a “well
defined” sphere separate from strict liability.242 Neither Correia,
nor any subsequent decision of a Massachusetts court, has at
tempted to justify how such a significant restriction on warranty lia
bility could comport with the legislature’s intent when: (1) the
legislature did not provide for it; (2) the legislature had abolished
assumption of the risk to make negligence a more generous means
of recovery; and (3) the legislature had made warranty law still
more generous than negligence law.
Additionally, the very nature of the Correia defense was at
odds with the recently decided Uloth, which remains undisturbed to
the present, and which has never been meaningfully distinguished.
After all, had not the garbage truck worker known of the patent
danger posed by the descending teeth of the trash compactor and
nonetheless proceeded to work on the back of the truck? Uloth
itself felt compelled to analyze this conduct to determine whether it
fell within the old assumption of the risk defense, which applied
since the accident had predated the abolition of that defense.243 It
is hard to imagine how Uloth would not have been subject to the
unreasonable use defense. The great insight of Uloth, which the
reporters for the new Restatement have called in their survey of the
law the leading design defect case in Massachusetts,244 was the abo
lition of the patent danger rule.245 Decisions subsequent to Correia
have failed to give much definition to the second prong of the de
fense, “unreasonably” proceeding toward the danger.246 It appears
240. Id.
241. See Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-84 (Mass. 1980)
(describing defenses and their histories, including statutory repeal of the assumption of
risk defense).
242. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040.
243. Id. 1193 n.7.
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note (1998).
245. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (rejecting pat
ent danger rule because burden of preventing “needless injury” should be placed on
manufacturer).
246. See, e.g., Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312-13 (Mass.
1988) (worker injured when trying to put grease in industrial machine in quasi-emer
gency situation barred from recovery under warranty due to unreasonable use defense;
no discussion of what made the conduct, beyond knowledge of the danger,
unreasonable).
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to be enough that the plaintiff knew of the danger and used the
product anyway.247 There is nothing more to the unreasonableness
component than using the product with knowledge of the danger,
making it indistinguishable in practice from the patent danger rule
condemned in Uloth.
In theory, the unreasonable use defense differed slightly from
assumption of the risk in that Correia contained a subjective ele
ment of whether the plaintiff knew of the danger, and an objective
element of “unreasonably” proceeding toward it.248 Paradoxically,
the Correia defense was more protective of defendants than the old
assumption of risk defense. The objective element of Correia
meant that the more nuanced consideration of the plaintiff’s partic
ular characteristics was gone. In Uloth, the court decided that a
directed verdict for the defense was not warranted in part because
the plaintiff was a slow learner, had never received instructions, and
was inexperienced.249 All of this went to the issue of whether that
particular user had subjectively known and appreciated the risks of
working on the garbage truck.250 Further, Uloth noted that it was
rare for a court to determine, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff had
assumed the risk; it was typically a jury question.251 By its formula
tion, the Correia defense opened the door to courts to make the
objective “unreasonable use” determinations as a matter of law,
which would preclude recovery before the plaintiff reached a
jury.252
Ironically, Correia became the greatest victory for product
manufacturers and sellers in the modern era of Massachusetts prod
ucts liability law. It traded the rhetorical triumph of strict liability
for an enormous litigation advantage which defendants would em
ploy to great effect.253 In Correia itself, the defendant tire manu
facturer, Firestone, had argued for the application of the
comparative negligence statute to warranty actions.254 The Su
preme Judicial Court turned aside Firestone’s arguments for the ap
247. See, e.g., id.
248. Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co. (Allen I), 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986).
249. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D. Mass. 1996) (granting
summary judgment in part due to Correia defense).
253. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312-14 (Mass. 1988) (plain
tiff barred from recovery under warranty theory even though defendant negligent in
designing product).
254. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Mass. 1983).
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plication of what is often a partial defense, and maintained, for the
moment, the rhetorical and theoretical purity of strict liability.255
But it had given Firestone a complete defense that was more effec
tive in defeating recovery.256 Because the unreasonable use de
fense was created out of whole cloth, Firestone could scarcely have
predicted such a result, or have expected to do so well. Correia was
not a bad decision because it is unhelpful to plaintiffs. Correia was
a bad decision not only because it is confusing and requires mindbending inquiries by courts and juries, but mostly because it blocks
liability where it should be imposed and it attempts to extend liabil
ity where it should not.
After Correia, Massachusetts courts quickly experienced diffi
culty in applying it. Because Back, Smith, and Uloth had held that
the manufacturer’s duty to design and provide warnings turned on
the reasonable foreseeability of the uses of the product, and not just
on the manufacturer’s intended uses, it became necessary to parse
out “misuse,” “unforeseeable use[ ],” and “unreasonable mis
use.”257 Since it was not enough to simply cry that a plaintiff had
misused a product, a court was called upon to assess whether the
use was reasonably foreseeable.258 If the use was reasonably fore
seeable, then the manufacturer had a duty to take reasonable steps
to design around that use.259 It was the burden of the plaintiff to
show reasonable foreseeability, since it was the plaintiff’s burden to
prove the existence of the manufacturer’s duty.260 The Massachu
setts Appeals Court in Fahey v. Rockwell 261 then read Correia to
say that “unforeseeable misuse” and “unreasonable use” could be
used interchangeably.262
The next year, in Allen v. Chance Manufacturing Co. (Allen I),
the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with a certified ques
tion from a federal district court confused about the state of the
law.263 The federal court asked whether the “misuse defense” ap
plied to foreseeable and unforeseeable uses of the product in a
255.
256.
257.
plain the
258.
259.
260.
261.
1985).
262.
263.

Id. at 1040-41.
Id.
See generally, Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-27 (Mass. 1986) (trying to ex
interplay between the three concepts).
See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978).
Id.
See Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1041 n.15; Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519, 525-26 (Mass. App. Ct.
Id. at 526 n.13.
Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1986).
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breach of implied warranty action.264 Allen I attempted to alleviate
the confusion first by noting that there never had been a “misuse
defense” to a warranty claim.265 Second, Allen I said that it was the
plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable foreseeability of his use
of the product, and that it was an affirmative defense for the defen
dant to prove that the plaintiff had unreasonably used the product
within the meaning of Correia.266 These two inquires, Allen I main
tained, had “nothing to do” with each other.267 Thus, only after the
plaintiff had proved that his use of the product was reasonably fore
seeable, would the defendant attempt to show that the use was un
reasonable.268 Having set out this methodology, Allen I took the
opportunity to correct Fahey’s statement that “unreasonable use”
and “unforeseeable misuse” could be used interchangeably.269
These fine distinctions caused obvious doctrinal tensions, not
to mention a level of abstraction apt to perplex the most attentive
and intelligent jury. After Correia, a trial court and the jury would
be required to assess the plaintiff’s use of the product through a
number of different lenses. Take, for example, the facts of Fahey,
which involved a worker who removed a safety guard on a printing
press and then performed a common task (removing an impurity
from a plate) that caused his arm to be pulled into the press, crush
ing it.270 After the decision of the appeals court, the case was to be
submitted to a jury.271 First, it would have been necessary for the
jury to determine whether the plaintiff’s removal of the impurity
after removing the guard was reasonably foreseeable as part of the
plaintiff’s proof on negligent design and breach of warranty, taking
into account the amount of inefficiency and waste of time caused by
the placement of the guard on the machine, which were considera
ble.272 Second, these same actions would have been assessed to de
termine whether the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by
the design of the product or by some intervening cause, such as the
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
1985).
271.
272.

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326-27.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327 n.2.
Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (Mass. App. Ct.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 523-24.
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plaintiff’s own conduct.273 This proximate cause question would
turn on the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s removal of the guard.274
Third, the plaintiff’s conduct would have been considered to deter
mine the plaintiff’s degree of negligence (i.e., the reasonableness of
his conduct, taking into account the risks and benefits of removing
the guard) under the comparative fault statute.275 Fourth, the
plaintiff’s actions would have to be examined to determine whether
they were knowing and unreasonable, as part of the Correia de
fense, presumably taking into account the same risks and benefits
of removing the guard.276 The court and the jury would have to
also understand as part of Correia that the unreasonable use in
quiry was separate from the plaintiff’s “ordinary negligence,” which
is irrelevant on the warranty claim.277 All of these issues overlap to
such a degree that they collapse into a single question: How reason
able was it for the plaintiff to remove the guard and to continue to
do his job? It is no wonder that Allen I acknowledged that distin
guishing misuse from Correia (or the old assumption of the risk de
fense) “has proven to be difficult to achieve.”278
The falseness of the distinction between “unforeseeable mis
use” and “unreasonableness use” in a case like Fahey is explained
by one prominent scholar in explaining how misuse and proximate
cause meld into one question:
If a court determines that a design defect exists [solely] because
the manufacturer has failed to include . . . safety devices, there is
no proximate cause question of any moment left to consider.
The very reason for declaring the design defective was to prevent
this kind of foreseeable misuse. Proximate cause could not, in
273. See Richard v. Amer. Mfg. Co., 489 N.E.2d 214, 215 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986) (finding of unreasonable use under Correia does not preclude finding for plaintiff
on proximate cause, thus separating the two inquiries).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 215 (affirming verdict dividing responsibility between defendant
and plaintiff); Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 524 (comparative negligence question for jury).
276. See Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 526 (Correia defense to be decided by jury).
277. See Hallmark Color Labs v. Damon Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1985) (jury instruction on Correia defense had to make clear that “ordinary
negligence” was irrelevant); Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
2001) (ordinary negligence irrelevant to breach of warranty claim).
278. Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 n.2 (Mass. 1986). Allen I went on to claim
that the distinction was in fact clear as there were two different scenarios: (1) the plain
tiff misuses the product when the danger posed by the defect is not apparent; and (2)
the plaintiff misuses the product when the danger is apparent. Id. at 1326. Only in the
second situation would the Correia (or the old assumption of risk) defense apply. Un
fortunately in the second situation, the alleged “misuse” is usually alleged to be the
knowing, unreasonable use of the product, as was true in Fahey.
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such a case, present an obstacle on the grounds of misuse. To do
so would negate the very reason for declaring the design defec
tive in the first [place].279

The Correia defense established yet another layer of reviewing
the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct. If, for example, it was
determined in Fahey that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
worker would have removed the guard because (1) the guard sub
stantially increased the amount of time required to make the ma
chine ready for operation; (2) the guard caused the press workers to
have to stand off-balance while changing plates; and (3) the guard
caused scratches to the plates, and the machine was defectively de
signed because the guard could have been placed elsewhere at little
cost and with increase productivity,280 then it would be redundant
to ask, as part of the proximate cause question, whether the injury
was a foreseeable result of the poor design. It was a poor design
because it encouraged the removal of the guard and made more
likely the kind of injury that was in fact sustained. It is increasingly
redundant to ask under Correia whether using the product without
the guard was unreasonable after having determined that it was rea
sonably foreseeable for a press worker to do just that. Massachu
setts courts have struggled to find a coherent way to explain
Correia for the simple reason that it cannot be done.
Having firmly established Correia as an affirmative defense,
Massachusetts courts were left with other doctrinal tensions. Cor
reia decided that the knowing, unreasonable use of a product was,
as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.281
Proximate cause must be established by the plaintiff in his prima
facie case to prevail.282 If “unreasonable use” simply negated an
element of the plaintiff’s proof, it should not properly be thought of
as a defense for which the plaintiff has the burden of proof. If it is a
true affirmative defense, then the plaintiff’s unreasonable use
would only come into play once the plaintiff had established proxi
mate cause, i.e., a sufficiently foreseeable causal connection be
tween the product’s defect and the events leading to the injury,283
which would already include the plaintiff’s use of the product.
279. Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 421 (1978).
280. Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 521-22.
281. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983).
282. Id.
283. See Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (proxi
mate cause standard under Massachusetts law).
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Correia became more awkward still when the defendant in
Colter v. Barber-Greene Co. attempted to apply the “unreasonable
use” defense to a negligence claim.284 In Colter, an industrial
worker was injured while trying to put grease into a machine while
it was running in a situation that he considered to be an emer
gency.285 The plaintiff’s theory, much like the theory of defect in
Fahey, was that the machine was defectively designed because it
encouraged the removal of a safety guard, which would have pre
vented the injury had it been in place.286 At trial, the jury found
that the plaintiff, manufacturer, and a seller of the product were
each partially at fault, which entitled plaintiff to partial recovery on
the negligence claim.287 The jury also found that the defendants
had breached the implied warranty of merchantability, but found
against the plaintiff on the Correia defense.288 The defendants ar
gued that since they had prevailed on the Correia defense, the
plaintiff’s unreasonable use was the “sole proximate cause” of his
injuries, according to the plain language of Correia.289 If the plain
tiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause for his injuries, which
would ordinarily be a complete defense to a negligence claim, then
the defendants would arguably be entitled to a judgment in their
favor as a matter of law.290
By making the Correia defense a part of proximate cause, the
court in Colter found itself in an embarrassing position. As Colter
aptly pointed out, allowing the plaintiff’s negligent behavior to
serve as a complete bar to recovery was foreclosed by the Massa
chusetts comparative fault statute, which had abolished contribu
tory negligence as a defense unless it was greater than the fault of
the defendants.291 The jury in Colter had found that the plaintiff’s
fault was not greater than the combined fault of two defendants,
and the court could hardly make, as a matter of law, a contrary
finding.292 Further, the assumption of risk defense was expressly
abolished by the legislature in negligence cases.293 Admitting that
the Correia defense and assumption of the risk were rather similar,
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312 (Mass. 1988).
Id. at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1307.
Id.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id.
Id. at 1314-15.
Id.
Id. at 1315 n.14.
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Colter said that applying Correia in negligence actions “may” be
precluded by the legislature’s action against assumption of the
risk.294 Colter tried to escape this imbroglio by distinguishing the
nature of proximate cause in warranty and negligence actions, stat
ing that “negligence liability does not focus on a sole cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.”295 With that, Colter held that the Correia de
fense would not apply to the negligence claim.296 It did, however,
notice the incongruity of the results obtained.297 The supposedly
more robust theory of recovery, breach of implied warranty, had
been defeated by the all-or-nothing nature of the Correia defense.
Because the jury was allowed to apportion fault on the negligence
claim, the plaintiff could be allowed to recover damages for severe
injuries caused by an admittedly defectively designed product.298
The Colter court suggested that a “fairer system” be installed that
would make the results in negligence and warranty cases “more
consistent,” but this was a matter, it believed, for legislative ac
tion.299 This plea for legislative assistance was strange in that the
Correia defense had been a judicial creation, not the product of
legislation. Having perhaps not thought through the implications of
this new, powerful defense, the court was asking for help to clean
up the mess it had created. Colter apparently did not think abro
gating Correia was a solution.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the jury ver
dicts handed down in Allen v. Chance Manufacturing Co., (herein
after Allen II), which followed the Supreme Judicial Court’s
answers to certified questions in Allen I, soon faced the problems
caused by Correia and Colter.300 In Allen II, the defendant sought
to establish that the conduct of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s em
ployer was the “sole proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries,
which occurred while the plaintiff was using a product without
safety goggles.301 The trial court had refused to give an instruction
that stated that the product manufacturer was entitled to a verdict
in its favor if the negligence of the employer or the plaintiff em
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
ory even
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1315.
Id.
Id. at 1314-15 (explaining how plaintiff could recover under negligence the
if partially at fault).
Id. at 1315.
Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co. (Allen II), 873 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 467-71.
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ployee was the “sole proximate cause” of the injuries.302 The First
Circuit held that this was error and that the instruction should have
been given with respect to the warranty claim as well as the negli
gence claim, notwithstanding Colter’s reasoning that the concept of
sole proximate cause does not apply to negligence actions.303 Allen
II explained that Colter was trying to show why the Correia defense
only applied to breach of warranty claims; it was not doing away
with “sole proximate cause” entirely, a doctrine which the Correia
decision itself recognized.304 In short, the Allen II court essentially
repudiated the logic but not the holding of Colter, which was the
most diplomatic way to extricate itself from the awkward spot the
First Circuit found itself in. It was thus apparent that Colter’s at
tempt to square the circle in its explanation of why the Correia de
fense would not apply to negligence actions had failed. The
misbegotten Correia defense led to the unsatisfactory mental gym
nastics in Colter, which led to the strained logic of Allen II, which in
turn led to the strange result in Allen II. On remand, the First Cir
cuit held, the jury would have to consider whether the plaintiff’s
failure to wear goggles was the “sole proximate cause” of his inju
ries on the negligence and warranty claims, and then to consider
whether that failure was the “sole proximate cause” of his injuries
as a result of the Correia defense.305 Meanwhile, the jury would
have to be told that the “ordinary negligence”306 of the plaintiff
should be disregarded on the warranty claim, necessitating a deci
sion on whether the failure to wear goggles was ordinary negli
gence, or more severe negligence, before it even reached the
Correia defense. How these dual “sole proximate cause” inquiries,
both relating to the same fairly simple factual issue, could be articu
lated separately and coherently was left unsaid.307
302. Id. at 467.
303. Id. at 471.
304. Id.; see also Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1038
39 (Mass. 1983) (explicitly recognizing that negligence of plaintiff’s employer would be
relevant to issue of sole proximate cause on negligence claim).
305. Allen II, 873 F.2d at 473. The court made it clear that the submission to the
jury of the Correia defense would depend on the evidence developed about the plain
tiff’s subjective awareness of the risk. Id.
306. See Hallmark Color Labs, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1052, 1054
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
307. Richard v. Am. Mfg. Co., 489 N.E.2d 214, 215-16 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
Presaging the result in Colter, the Richard court envisioned that a finding of unreasona
ble use on a warranty count would not stop a jury from appropriately finding that the
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id.
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It may be persuasively argued that the test of a legal doctrine is
not its logical consistency or its elegant formulation, but whether it
consistently arrives, by one route or another, at satisfactory results.
By that measure, the Correia doctrine should be found wanting.
The Colter opinion, as previously noted, expressed misgivings about
the end result, which gave the plaintiff a partial recovery under neg
ligence, but nothing under warranty, due to the Correia defense.308
In Richard, a worker whose hand was crushed for want of a simple
guard was able to recover in a design case under negligence where
the jury found the manufacturer 70% at fault and the worker 30%
at fault.309 The worker recovered nothing on the warranty claim
because of Correia.310
A similar result was obtained in Cigna Insurance Co. v. Oy
Saunatec, Ltd. where the plaintiff was found to be 35% negligent
but was found to be guilty of unreasonable use, allowing partial re
covery under negligence but nothing under warranty.311 These out
comes show that the Correia defense has, in many cases,
transformed the implied warranty of merchantability into an instru
ment of consumer protection that is unforgiving to injured consum
ers. One practitioner recognized this dynamic shortly after Correia
was decided, when he noted that the all or nothing nature of the
unreasonable use defense presented something of a dilemma for
plaintiff lawyers choosing an avenue of recovery.312 If an injured
consumer is better off seeking compensation under a negligence
theory that is intelligently applied and shorn of encumbrances like
the patent danger rule,313 than under a warranty claim burdened by
the Correia defense, is the implied warranty of merchantability a
significant addition to the cause of consumer protection in Massa
chusetts? The Correia court certainly saw the Massachusetts ver
sion of strict liability as significant, almost revolutionary, and
effecting a large expansion of liability.314 It can be fairly said then
that the Correia court failed to meet its own objectives.
308. Colter v. Barber-Green Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1315 (Mass. 1988).
309. Richard, 489 N.E.2d at 215.
310. Id.
311. Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).
312. Raymond J. Kenney, Jr., Defective Products in Massachusetts—A 1984 Up
date, 69 MASS. L. REV. 108, 109 (1984).
313. See Richard, 489 N.E.2d at 215 (affirming plaintiff’s verdict on negligent de
sign on theory that machine lacked simple guard that could have been installed without
undue cost) (citing Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978)).
314. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1038-40 (Mass.
1983) (expansive language about how strict liability is different from negligence).
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It is finally worth asking why the Supreme Judicial Court,
twelve years after the first amendments to the implied warranty of
merchantability, and several years after the landmark decisions in
Smith, Back, and Uloth, found it necessary to erect such a signifi
cant barrier to recovery, bearing an uncanny resemblance to the
assumption of risk defense abolished in negligence actions by the
Massachusetts legislature?315 If the Correia decision had been an
acknowledged retrenchment in products liability law, one coming
after the court had realized that earlier decisions had expanded the
rights of plaintiffs too much, the new defense would have been un
derstandable. Yet, Correia purported to do nothing of the kind,
enthusiastically propounding an expansive theory of strict liabil
ity.316 Perhaps the Correia court did not fully appreciate the impli
cations of its decision, believing that “unreasonable use” would be a
limited defense, especially with its qualifier that “ordinary negli
gence” would do nothing to limit the plaintiff’s recovery on a war
ranty claim. If true, the court must have had dim memories of the
assumption of risk defense, which had been part of Massachusetts
law not long before.317 The real explanation lies with Correia’s
unquestioning adherence to the 402A Maxim. By 1983, section
402A had become what some commentators have called a “holy
writ,” because of its near universal adoption in the United States.318
Section 402A contained, despite its bold advancement of strict lia
bility in tort, vestiges of the law that existed prior to 1965, such as
the assumption of the risk defense.319 The Correia defense is a reit
eration of Comment n of section 402A, which stated the well-estab
lished rule (for 1965) that assumption of the risk could completely
bar recovery.320 Rather than engaging in practical policymaking, as
the court did in Uloth, (which itself is difficult to square with the
Correia defense), the Correia court placed its faith in the words of
section 402A.

315. See supra Part I.D for discussions of Smith, Back, and Uloth.
316. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040.
317. See Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193 n.7 (noting assumption of risk abolished by
statute as of January 1, 1974).
318. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512
(1992).
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
320. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040-41.
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B. The Lamentable Hindsight Test
While consumer protection advocates may have suffered a de
feat with the invention of the Correia defense, they probably saw
the adoption of the so-called “hindsight test” in failure to warn
cases as the beginning of true strict liability in Massachusetts. This
test, announced in the 1984 decision of Hayes v. Ariens Co.,
presumes that the manufacturer or seller knew of all the risks of the
product and measures the duty to warn in warranty cases against
that presumed knowledge.321 It is called the “hindsight test” be
cause it imputes all of the knowledge of risk at the time of trial back
to the time the alleged failure to warn occurred.322 It does not mat
ter whether the defendant knew, should have known, or could have
known about the risk at the time the product was made.323 Indeed,
the knowledge may not have even existed at the time the product
was made or sold.324 As such, it truly was liability without fault.325
The hindsight test did not suffer from the doctrinal inconsisten
cies and logical errors of the Correia defense; it was simply unwise
policy. While it might have lightened considerably the burdens of
injured plaintiffs in proving their cases, and it might have turned
manufacturers and sellers into virtual insurers of product users,326
the victory for plaintiffs was ephemeral. It was announced and re
peated in contexts where it had no practical effect, in dicta.327
When it came time to actually apply the hindsight test, courts, espe
cially federal courts, blanched at imposing a duty to warn that man
ufacturers and sellers could not perform.328 By 1998, the flirtation
with true strict liability in warning cases was over when the Su
preme Judicial Court decided in Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp. to put an end to the hindsight test.329
321. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
322. Vasallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.
323. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78.
324. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (stat
ing that the fact that the state of technology made the product unsafe does not matter
under strict liability).
325. Owen, supra note 97, at 978.
326. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546-47 (adopting explicitly risk-spreading rationale
for hindsight test while acknowledging that liability is not imposed for failing to do what
should have been done).
327. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78; Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596
N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass. 1992).
328. See Anderson v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1986); Welch v.
Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
329. Vasallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998).
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Hayes v. Ariens Co. 330 was an unlikely case to serve as a con
duit for true strict liability in Massachusetts. The plaintiff had tried
to clear out some snow that was clogging the discharge chute of a
snow blower he was using.331 He had put his hand in the chute
while the machine was still running, in contravention of a warning
on the chute, and his fingers came into contact with moving blades
injuring several of his fingers.332 The plaintiff claimed that the
warning was inadequate and that the design was defective.333 An
expert for the plaintiff testified about two alternative designs that
would have prevented the injury, and which were “economically
and technologically feasible” at the time the snow blower was
made.334 On its facts, Hayes did not call for the application of the
hindsight test, since the fault-based “knew or should have known”
standard used in negligence law would have allowed the plaintiff to
prevail on the warning and design claims, provided that his wit
nesses were believed. Indeed, the plaintiff contended that the de
sign of the snow blower did not comply with existing industry
standards.335 The court was not faced with the real-life implications
of telling a manufacturer that it should have warned of dangers only
known in hindsight.
The hindsight test emerged from this unlikely set of facts be
cause the jury’s verdicts appeared inconsistent. On the negligence
count, the manufacturer and the plaintiff were found 40% and 60%
responsible, respectively, precluding recovery under the compara
tive fault statute.336 On the warranty count, the jury found that the
manufacturer did not breach the implied warranty of
merchantability.337 Since a finding of negligence meant that the de
fendant had breached the warranty, the plaintiff claimed that the
jury should have been told the verdicts were inconsistent and
should have been told to deliberate further.338 The manufacturer
attempted to reconcile the verdicts, since they were in its favor, ar
guing that the finding of the defendant’s negligence must have been
based on a negligent post-sale failure to warn.339 This would have
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 276.
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jibed with the finding of no breach of warranty, since the breach
would have occurred, if at all, at the time of sale.340 This was a
specious argument since the jury had received no instruction on
post-sale warnings.341 Hayes noted other reasons why the defen
dant’s post-sale failure to warn theory was flawed and could have
stopped there to order a new trial.342
Instead, the court elaborated on warranty liability, invoking
the Strict Liability Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not
Conduct Maxim, to give another reason why the jury’s verdicts
were inconsistent.343 Hayes said that in strict liability, the warning
is measured by the warning given by a seller who is “fully aware of
the risks presented by the product.”344 In strict liability, the state of
industry or scientific knowledge is irrelevant, “as is the culpability
of the defendant.”345 Accordingly, in a breach of warranty warning
case, the duty to warn subsumes all of the subsequently-acquired
knowledge that would underlie a negligent post-sale duty to warn
claim.346 Hayes did not base the hindsight test on the precedent of
Massachusetts cases; instead it relied on authority from other juris
dictions, and it did not even give a polite nod to the long-estab
lished rule in negligent failure to warn cases that the knowledge of
risk would not be presumed.347
The hindsight test was dicta, but there could be little doubt that
Hayes’ expansive statement about strict liability was an earnestly
held view about Massachusetts products liability law. Strict liabil
ity, it believed, was “imposed as a matter of social policy,”348 echo
ing the sentiments of Correia, decided just a year before.349
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 276-77.
343. Id. at 277-78.
344. Id. at 277.
345. Id.
346. A post-sale failure to warn claim can be validly asserted when a commercial
product seller is in a position to provide a warning about a product-related risk after the
sale of the product, and a reasonable seller, under the circumstances, would provide
such a warning. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998).
347. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78 (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), as the leading hindsight test decision). Beshada’s holding was
quickly limited to its facts in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J.
1984). The Supreme Judicial Court had long held that the duty to warn extended only
to dangers that the defendant knew or should have known. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Mass. 1977) (rejecting presumption of knowl
edge); doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 879 n.9 (Mass. 1975).
348. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 278.
349. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983).
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Although it invoked social policy, Hayes did not articulate how the
hindsight test specifically would further any social policy goal. In
stead, the hindsight test was aimed at vindicating the Product, Not
Conduct Maxim, which held that a breach of warranty claim would
look at the product only, and not the conduct of the seller. This
maxim could work in a manufacturing defect case, where the fitness
of the product could be discerned from examining the product it
self. In a warning case, the manufacturer’s sin, if any, was its failure
to provide instructions, to warn of a risk, to do something. In short,
the sin was the manufacturer’s conduct. The hindsight test came
closest to taking the focus away from the manufacturer’s conduct by
attempting to make the reasonableness of that conduct
irrelevant.350
Despite the relative clarity with which it was announced, the
hindsight test found few adherents, even among the justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court which had propounded it. In MacDonald v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., a 1985 warning case decided just a
year after Hayes, the Supreme Judicial Court grappled with the
learned intermediary rule for prescription drugs and the adequacy
of warnings, but it was content to describe the duty to warn for both
negligence and warranty claims in terms of reasonable care.351
MacDonald did not take issue with the trial court having treated
the failure to warn under negligence and warranty as a “single
claim.”352 Although the issue of the defendant’s knowledge of risk
was not squarely presented in MacDonald,353 the case was a stark
example of the harm the hindsight test could cause. The prescrip
tion drug industry depends on innovation, and the law has tradi
tionally recognized that the risks of prescription drugs must be
weighed against the substantial social benefits they provide.354 If
350. Of course, the Product, Not Conduct Maxim could never be true even with
the presumption of knowledge, because the adequacy of the warning would still need to
be judged. Massachusetts courts have never attempted to impose absolute duties as to
the adequacy of warnings, since the content of warnings depends so much on the con
text in which they are given. Inevitably, the adequacy of warnings must be judged by a
rule of reason. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass.
1985) (articulating an open-ended reasonableness standard for judging adequacy of
warnings where “common sense” prevails).
351. Id. at 70.
352. Id. at 68.
353. Id. (noting “narrow issue” presented of whether manufacturer owes duty to
directly warn patient).
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (limiting liability
for prescription drugs on account of the social benefits they provide and the risk that
comes with innovative drugs).
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manufacturers were held responsible for knowledge acquired years
later in a rapidly changing field of science, the liability and chilling
effect on the development of new drugs could be enormous.355
Federal courts applying Massachusetts law did not recognize
the hindsight test. In Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the plaintiff
attempted, on the strength of Hayes, to exclude “state of the art”
(i.e., the state of scientific knowledge) evidence and to obtain an
instruction that informed the jury that a product seller is presumed
to know of all risks of the product.356 The federal district court and
First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to bar state of the art evi
dence or to apply the presumption of knowledge, instead holding
that the seller’s duty to warn is bounded by what it knew or should
have known about the product’s risks.357 Anderson involved asbes
tos-containing products, and it was one of thousands of such cases
against a large number of defendants.358 Because all Massachusetts
federal court asbestos cases had been consolidated, the disposition
of the state of the art issue applied to all of those cases.359 The
stakes were enormous, since the state of the art defense was one of
the most useful defenses raised by attorneys for asbestos companies
and because the state of the art issue was vigorously contested.360
Applying the presumption of knowledge would have greatly tilted
the odds at trial in favor of plaintiffs. Unlike in Hayes, where the
issue was theoretical, applying the hindsight test in asbestos cases
had real consequences.
Anderson could not take seriously what Hayes had plainly said,
predicting that Massachusetts courts would not in fact follow the
Hayes dicta about the hindsight test.361 Its critique was poignant
and was proved true, eventually. Anderson pointed out that the
dangers from the snow blower’s blades were obvious in Hayes, un
like with asbestos where even experts did not know, at least at some
points, about the dangers.362 Indeed, the duty to warn was scarcely
355. See Brown v. Sup. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting strict liabil
ity for prescription drugs because it would stifle the development of new drugs and for
other policy reasons).
356. Anderson v. Owens–Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1986).
357. Id. at 2-5.
358. Id. at 1 & n.1; John H. Kennedy, Asbestos Consolidation Wins Mixed Re
views, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 1991, at 49 (noting 2800 federal court cases then pend
ing in Massachusetts).
359. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 1 & n.1.
360. See Gideon Mark, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 885
89 (1983).
361. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 3-4.
362. Id. at 3.
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contested in Hayes, since the manufacturer had in fact provided a
warning.363 Anderson took aim at the foundations of the hindsight
test, pointing out that imposing the presumption of knowledge
could not improve the real world behavior of product manufactur
ers and sellers, since a warning that the product may pose unknown
dangers is no warning at all.364
This, after all, was the telling blow against the hindsight test; it
could not be tied to making products safer and preventing injuries
in the first place. While the hindsight test could unquestionably aid
in the compensation of injured product users, where would those
compensation funds come from? The loss-spreading rationale rec
ognized in section 402A and the early strict liability cases, involving
manufacturing defects only had force if those losses could be in
sured against (either by the manufacturer itself or through a policy
with an insurance company), which required some knowledge of
the risk. Insuring against the rare soda bottle that makes it through
quality control is one thing, insuring against generic risks that might
become known decades later is something else entirely. Anderson
refused to force product manufacturers to buy insurance on a
“blind basis.”365
Anderson, despite its rejection of the hindsight test, did stake
out something of a middle ground between the “knew or should
have known” standard from negligence theory, and the presump
tion of knowledge that Hayes had appended to warranty law.366 In
Anderson, the charge to the jury, affirmed by the First Circuit, held
the defendants to the knowledge of experts in the industry “or in
view of the state of medical and scientific knowledge in general.”367
This expert standard increased the duty of product sellers to dis
cover risks about their products.368 Previously, the seller was sim
ply held to the standard of an “ordinary, reasonably prudent
manufacturer in like circumstances.”369 This rule made the burden
on product sellers more onerous, but it was a rule that they could
theoretically comply with. Although the expert standard was prob
ably more a refinement of the negligence duty of reasonable care
363. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
364. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 4.
365. Id. at 5.
366. Id. at 4 (noting expert knowledge standard is higher than negligence stan
dard).
367. Id. at 2.
368. Id. at 4.
369. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. 1978).
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under the circumstances, it provided a convenient way for Ander
son and other courts, to maintain the supposedly clear distinction
between warranty and negligence, and thereby not run headlong
into the three Maxims, which Massachusetts courts held dear.370
The expert rule would prove influential once the hindsight rule was
abolished.371
While federal courts in Massachusetts followed Anderson,372
Massachusetts state courts were not following the hindsight test ei
ther. In Welch v. Keene Corp., another personal injury asbestos
case, the appeals court described the duty to warn in traditional
negligence terms for a warranty claim.373 Welch cited Hayes for
another point of law, and then cited Anderson for the proposition
that the duty to warn only extends to dangers that are known or
reasonably knowable.374 Welch did not even bother to acknowl
edge the hindsight test, or attempt to reconcile Hayes with
Anderson.375
In light of what might be called obtuseness, or perhaps rebel
lion, against the hindsight test, the Supreme Judicial Court tried in
the 1992 decision of Simmons v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., to
bring these errant courts back into line by reaffirming its support
for the hindsight test.376 Simmons observed quite correctly that the
Hayes dicta was a clear statement of Massachusetts law.377 Sim
mons’ admonition was also dicta, and so the hindsight test had still
not been applied where the imputation of knowledge could have
actual effect.378
370. In Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., the First Circuit took pains to note that sec
tion 402A imposes a duty higher than due care due to the expert standard before com
ing to the conclusion that in failure to warn cases negligence and warranty were quite
similar. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1231-33 (1st Cir. 1990) (judgment
vacated on federal preemption grounds unrelated to holdings on Massachusetts tort
law), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1992); see also supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the three Maxims).
371. See infra Part III.A.
372. See Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1231-33; Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 378
(D. Mass. 1996); Collins v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 629 F. Supp. 540, 543 (D. Mass. 1986)
(following Anderson’s trial court decision rejecting Hayes’ dictum).
373. Welch v. Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
374. Id. at 770.
375. Id.
376. Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass. 1992),
abrogated by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
377. Id.
378. Id. (noting explicitly that the advisory nature of its discussion of the hind
sight test).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt

52

unknown

Seq: 52

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

9:54

[Vol. 33:1

The next year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court suggested that
the viability of the Hayes dicta was still an open question, despite
the statement in Simmons, but the appeals court did not reach the
issue because the plaintiff had not objected to the introduction of
state of the art evidence at trial.379 Two years later, a federal court
stated that the duty to warn extended to dangers the manufacturer
“knows or should know,” again without acknowledging Hayes or
the hindsight test.380
By the time Simmons renewed vows with the hindsight test in
1992, the nominal state of products liability law in Massachusetts
differed greatly from the actual state of affairs in failure to warn
cases. Hayes had given Massachusetts a revolution in products lia
bility law and nobody came. The federal courts were not following
two clearly written decisions by Massachusetts’ highest court, a
court they were bound to follow on matters of state law. The hind
sight test seemed like it might be a dead letter in state courts as
well. In the City of Boston asbestos case, a massive litigation in
state court involving thousands of pages of testimony, hundreds of
exhibits, forty-five days of trial, and presumably very able counsel,
neither side ever took the position that state of the art evidence was
irrelevant,381 despite Hayes’ statement that “[t]he state of the art is
irrelevant.”382 It was difficult to predict what a Massachusetts trial
court might do in a failure to warn case. Would it follow the dicta
in Hayes and Simmons, or would it follow the better reasoned deci
sions of the First Circuit? This was not an academic question, espe
cially in asbestos cases like Anderson, Welch, or City of Boston,
where the difference between what was known about asbestos in
the 1980s and 1990s was markedly different from what was known
decades earlier when some of the asbestos workers had been ex
posed.383 This ambiguity on a question so important cried out for
resolution, and the Supreme Judicial Court did resolve it in 1998, in
the final part of the modern era of Massachusetts products liability
law.
379. City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994).
380. Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 378 (D. Mass. 1996).
381. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d at 1388, 1393.
382. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
383. See Alex J. Grant, Note, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?: Applying the
Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Property Damage Actions, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 695,
701-03 (1995); Mark, supra note 360, at 885-89.
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C. The Uncertainty About the Reasonable Alternative Design
Requirement Grows
The question of whether to require the plaintiff to show an al
ternative design that is arguably safer than an allegedly defective
design has been the single most contentious products liability issue
in the last twenty-five years.384 During the six years (1992 to 1998)
the new Restatement was being drafted, debate centered on that
very subject in a project that canvassed all of the major tort issues
in products liability law.385 The new Restatement’s ultimate deci
sion to explicitly require a showing of a reasonable alternative de
sign as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is what made the new
Restatement controversial, with charges that the document had
taken a decidedly pro-defendant slant.386 By contrast, the debate
over the hindsight test, which could easily be framed in terms of
whether a court was being sufficiently faithful to the concept of
strict liability, has proven to be a somewhat one-sided affair, as it
became quickly apparent during the 1980s that decisions like Hayes
in Massachusetts and Beshada in New Jersey were outliers.387 Al
though the reasonable alternative design requirement does not fit
neatly within the strict liability/negligence divide that has preoccu
pied courts, commentators, and practitioners in Massachusetts and
elsewhere, it is of fundamental importance because it significantly
increases the plaintiff’s burden of making a viable claim, and be
cause of its potential widespread impact on consumer choice and
the American marketplace.388 All of this is to say that the issue of
whether a reasonable alternative design was a non-essential factor
in the judicial review of product designs, or whether it was, in fact, a
requirement, was no idle question during the middle part of the
modern era of Massachusetts products liability law from 1983 to
1992.389 And yet, Massachusetts state courts refrained from resolv
ing it, continuing to suggest that it was just a factor but never saying
384. Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1062-63.
385. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt.
(1998).
386. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
90-93 (2002).
387. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note.
388. See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1069-70.
389. See id. at 1062-64 (describing controversy over reasonable alternative design
requirement).

R
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so explicitly.390 The First Circuit took up the issue in 1990, and held
explicitly that a reasonable alternative design is required in Massa
chusetts,391 and that has continued to be the law, at least in federal
court, to the present day.392 This led to another federal/state dis
parity on an important issue where state court decisions are sup
posed to be controlling.393 It was another muddled area of
Massachusetts products liability law to emerge during this middle
period.
As discussed earlier, Back had in 1978 set forth risk-utility fac
tors for reviewing the conscious design choices of manufacturers.394
It was a good start on the construction of a modern products liabil
ity law, and the question of whether a safer alternative design was
required had not presented itself. In Back, the plaintiff had
presented persuasive proof that specific aspects of the design of a
motor home contributed to making it unnecessarily dangerous in
the event of a crash.395 The plaintiff’s expert presented evidence of
alternative designs, which experts for defendants disputed, but that
disagreement was one for the finder of fact to resolve.396 The plain
tiff’s theory of defect centered around its evidence of design im
provements, and three of the five enumerated factors related to the
alternative design.397 Subsequent cases used the same Back factors
and those cases too involved plaintiffs assailing the design choices
of manufacturers by proposing marginal improvements to the de
sign that were technologically and economically feasible.398
Whether the alternative designs were feasible or not, whether they
were safer or not, or whether they would have prevented the plain
tiff’s injuries or not, were all matters for the finder of fact to decide,
but that was the battleground upon which the litigants fought.399
By making the Back factors non-exclusive and by making none
of them essential, Massachusetts courts had invited plaintiffs to
make design claims based on the overall risks and utilities of prod
390. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1310-11 (Mass. 1988) (setting
forth design defect factors, but not stating clearly whether alternative design is
required).
391. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on
other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
392. Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2004).
393. Compare Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11 with Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1225.
394. See supra Part I.D.1.
395. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 (Mass. 1978).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
399. Id.
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ucts, without proof of a safer alternative design.400 An open-ended
risk-utility test meant that costs and benefits could be weighed with
respect to competing designs of the product, or could be weighed
with respect to the product itself.401 In the latter case, plaintiffs
would ask the jury to find that the product’s dangers outweighed its
utility.402
The difference between these two inquiries might have seemed
obscure at the time the risk-utility factors were formulated by
courts across the United States in the 1970s, but a 1983 decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear that the difference
was fundamental. In O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., the plaintiff had
dived into an aboveground swimming pool and had suffered serious
injuries when his head struck the bottom.403 The plaintiff argued
that the vinyl bottom of the pool was too slippery, preventing him
from using his outstretched hands to brace himself before his head
hit the bottom.404 The plaintiff could not point to alternative mate
rial that would have made the bottom less slippery, so his claim was
reduced to the proposition that the manufacturer should not have
sold aboveground swimming pools because the pools were too dan
gerous.405 The New Jersey Supreme Court essentially accepted this
argument and held that a jury question existed on whether “the
risks of injury so outweighed the utility of the product as to consti
tute a defect.”406 With O’Brien, the issue of whether it was appro
priate for courts to engage in this kind of broad-based risk-utility
balancing was joined.407 Other jurisdictions began to accept this
theory in the 1980s.408 Massachusetts courts remained silent on the
question.
400. Id. at 1191-93.
401. Id.
402. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998) (prod
uct’s risks and utilities compared to determine whether it is manifestly unreasonable
design).
403. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 302 (N.J. 1983), superseded by stat
ute, N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-3 (1987), as recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
404. Id. at 302-03.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 306.
407. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La.
1986), superseded by statute, Louisiana Products Liability Act, Acts of 1988, N. 64, as
recognized in Fredrick v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1989) (adopting
broad-based risk-utility balancing similar to O’Brien).
408. See id. at 114; Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985)
(allowing imposition of liability on theory that the dangers of a type of cheap handgun
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In Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,409 the First Circuit Court
of Appeals was faced with a design defect claim with no claim that a
safer alternative design existed. Instead, the plaintiff argued that
the inherent risks of smoking cigarettes outweighed cigarettes’
overall social utility.410 Kotler canvassed Massachusetts products li
ability decisions and could find no instance of liability being im
posed in a design case without evidence that a “different, arguably
safer, alternative design was possible.”411 It then maintained that a
“safer alternative design is a sine qua non for the imposition of lia
bility,” citing Uloth and Colter.412 As this Article has previously
discussed, Uloth did hint at the essential nature of an alternative
design: “there is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show an avail
able design modification which would reduce the risk without un
due cost or interference with the performance of the machinery.”413
Colter repeated the same language, citing Uloth.414 Kotler had am
ple authority to reject a design claim on the theory that all ciga
rettes were inherently defective and unreasonably dangerous, not
the least of which being comment i of section 402A of the second
Restatement, which rejected liability for “good tobacco.”415 How
ever, Kotler overread Uloth and Colter because those cases did not
say that a safer alternative design was required.
Uloth and Colter stated that there was a case for the jury if
such proof was presented; they did not explicitly say that the jury
could not consider a design claim without such proof.416 Moreover,
Colter, Correia, and Hayes had also stated that “a defendant may
be liable on a theory of breach of warranty of merchantability even
though he or she properly designed, manufactured, and sold his or
her product,” on the theory that strict liability did not require proof

outweigh its benefits), superseded in part by statute, MD. CODE art. 27 § 36-1, as recog
nized in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1156 (Md. 2002).
409. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
410. Id. at 1225.
411. Id.
412. Id. (citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1310-11 (Mass.
1988); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978)).
413. See Uloth, 384 N.E.2d. at 1193; supra notes 144-149.
414. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11.
415. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. I (1965) (“good tobacco”
not unreasonably dangerous).
416. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11; Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193.
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of the defendant’s misconduct.417 This reference to “properly de
signed” could have been interpreted as holding open the possibility
of liability where there was no quarrel with the configuration of the
product, but where the inherent risks were assailed. That language,
purportedly derived from comment a of section 402A, was impre
cise and unwisely formulated. As this Article has contended, sec
tion 402A was primarily concerned with imposing strict liability for
manufacturing defects. When comment a spoke of liability even
where the defendant “has exercised all possible care in the prepara
tion and sale of the product,”418 it was contemplating the odd lot
(i.e., a small crack in a soda bottle) that had slipped through the
manufacturer’s quality control process. Comment a said nothing of
“proper designs,” but strict liability under section 402A would in
deed attach for a manufacturing defect in a properly designed prod
uct. The problem for the First Circuit was that Massachusetts
courts had no shared understanding that the concept of “strict lia
bility” was limited to manufacturing defects. Colter and Hayes, af
ter all, were design cases and they contained florid strict liability
language.419
Kotler did not deal with the inconvenient “properly designed”
language, nor did it address the fact that the Back factors were
presented as points for a court to consider, among other factors.420
There had been no attempt to assign importance or priority to the
factors, so it was a stretch, based on the cases decided prior to
Kotler, to find that the reasonable alternative design requirement
was a settled issue. Smith v. Ariens Co., decided the same day as
Back, saw no problem with extending design defect liability on a
theory that lacked any specific alternative design.421 In reality,
Kotler was making a prediction of how a Massachusetts state court
would handle a case premised upon the inherent dangers of a prod
uct, rather than applying well-established law. Such a case, like
Kotler, would hold vast implications for the American economy if
widely-used products like cigarettes or aboveground swimming
pools could be condemned on a categorical basis.422 But the picture
417. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313 (citing Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 279
(Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass.
1998); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1044 (Mass. 1983)).
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a.
419. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313; Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78.
420. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) (jury should
consider enumerated factors “among other factors”).
421. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957-58 (Mass. 1978).
422. See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1069-70.
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was still fuzzy for anyone having a stake in Massachusetts products
liability law. Arrayed against the holding of Kotler was a great deal
of language from Massachusetts courts that made this kind of cate
gorical liability possible.423 Kotler was another instance of a federal
court getting ahead of Massachusetts courts in formulating state
products liability law, as the First Circuit had done in rejecting the
hindsight test in Anderson.
III. THE UNFINISHED AND UNCERTAIN REDEFINITION
STRICT LIABILITY: 1998 TO PRESENT

OF

As the new millennium approached, the strict liability wave
had crested in other American jurisdictions, and the continuous ex
pansion of liability since the fall of the privity rule had stopped.424
In 1998, the final version of the Restatement was published, and it
was a substantial rethinking of section 402A.425 It was not surpris
ing then that in 1998, Massachusetts courts began to rethink some
prior decisions and to redefine, at least in some areas, the notion of
strict liability and the duties imposed by the implied warranty of
merchantability.
A. The End of the Hindsight Test
In 1998, the Supreme Judicial Court chose to abolish the hind
sight test, appropriately enough, when it did not matter. In Vassallo
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff was a woman whose sili
cone breast implants had failed.426 One had ruptured and the other
had holes through which silicone gel could leak.427 The failure of
the implants had caused scarring, autoimmune disease, pain and
suffering, and surgery to remove the medical devices.428 The plain
tiff claimed that the manufacturer of the implants had negligently
failed to provide adequate warnings, had negligently designed the
product, and had breached the implied warranty of
merchantability.429
On the negligent failure to warn claim, the plaintiff introduced
evidence which showed that the manufacturer knew, prior to the
423.
consider).
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (alternative design just a factor jury could
Owen, supra note 97, at 978-79.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introduction (1998).
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
Id. at 912-13.
Id.
Id. at 912.
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sale, that the implants were subject to rupture and that silicone gel
could escape, migrate though the patient’s body, and cause
problems with the body’s immune system.430 The warnings pro
vided to doctors addressed some of the research studies concerning
silicone implants, but they did not give notice of all of the risks.431
At trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the negli
gence and breach of warranty claims.432 On appeal, the Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the plaintiff’s verdict on the negligence count,
and therefore found it unnecessary to address the warranty
count.433 The court took the opportunity however to address the
defendants’ argument that the hindsight test should be abolished
and replaced with a standard requiring actual or constructive
knowledge of the product’s risks.434
Vassallo agreed that it was time to end Massachusetts’ experi
ment with the hindsight test for warranty claims in warning cases; a
decision that had no effect in Vassallo but would apply in future
litigation.435 The trial judge had, despite the open rebellion against
the hindsight test, given the presumption of knowledge instruction
over the defendants’ objection.436 On the facts, such an instruction
was unnecessary for plaintiff to prevail since there was substantial
proof that the manufacturer did in fact know about the risk that
eventually felled Florence Vassallo.437 The court noted that the in
struction was a “correct statement” of [the] law,” but it also recog
nized that Massachusetts was one of only four states to apply the
hindsight test.438 New Jersey’s law, which Hayes had found to be
persuasive support for the hindsight test in 1984, had changed.439
Vassallo also acknowledged that the presumption of knowledge was
not popular among scholars, and the test had “not been uniformly
applied [in] Massachusetts State and Federal courts,”440 an under
statement to be sure.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
v. Baxter
440.

Id. at 913-15.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 921-22.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id.; Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.
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Vassallo did more than acknowledge the obvious, which was
that the hindsight approach had little judicial support inside and
outside of Massachusetts, that academics were against it, and that
the court had rejected it. Vassallo stepped away from the strict lia
bility rhetoric and the easy incantation of the three Maxims. Al
though the court repeated the 402A Maxim,441 its analysis was
rooted in functional policy concerns, rather a desire to square the
result with notions of “strict liability.”442 Gone was the juxtaposi
tion of the “special responsibilities” of deep-pocketed product man
ufacturers and the rights and entitlements of the consumer.443
Gone was the problematic risk-spreading rationale, which Ander
son had dismantled effectively.444 In its place was a desire “to in
duce conduct that is capable of being performed,” a policy not
advanced by requiring warnings of unknowable risks.445 Leaning
heavily on the new Restatement, which had noted “that
[u]nforeseeable risks . . . by definition cannot specifically be warned
against,”446 Vassallo made the primary behavior of product manu
facturers and sellers the chief concern of Massachusetts products
liability law by concentrating on how best to incentivize them to
achieve an optimal level of product safety, and by recognizing the
limits of the judicial system to do so.447 Compensation to injured
users, by easing their burden of proof, was less important. The au
thority of the new Restatement was obviously important in the de
cision to reverse precedent, as was the fact that comment j of
section 402A had also used the “knew or should have known”
standard.448
Vassallo adopted the expert standard endorsed by Anderson,
and it emphasized that a manufacturer would retain a continuing
duty to give warnings (at least to purchasers) of risks discovered
after the sale.449 As a result, Massachusetts law would continue to
recognize duties unknown to negligence theory in the pre-modern
441. Id. at 923.
442. Id. at 922-23 (explaining how liability standard should induce product sellers
to give better warnings).
443. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983).
444. Anderson v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1986).
445. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.
446. Id. at 923.
447. Id. at 909.
448. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (“[T]he seller is
required to give warning against [the risk], if he has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the pres
ence of the ingredient and the danger.”).
449. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 924.
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era. Vassallo’s endorsement of the new Restatement seemed to sig
nal a new way of thinking about Massachusetts products liability
law, but it had not replaced section 402A, which remained the offi
cial source of doctrine. In 1999, one of the attorneys representing a
trade group for Massachusetts businesses who had submitted an
amicus brief in Vassallo, suggested in an Article that Vassallo rep
resented “the merger of negligence and warranty theories in” de
sign and warning cases.450 This merger, i.e., the end of strict
liability except for manufacturing defects, he argued, should be
completed by submitting design and warning claims under a single
theory to juries, rather than separately under negligence and war
ranty, and by applying the comparative negligence statute to all de
sign and warning claims.451 If that course had been taken, the Strict
Liability Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct
Maxim would have all been discarded in favor of a more enlight
ened and less ideological approach. This has not happened. Vas
sallo presented an opportunity to not only do away with the
hindsight test, but also to affect a doctrinal rethinking and to an
nounce a new theoretical basis for Massachusetts products liability
law. That moment passed, and Vassallo now just represents a sig
nificant addition to the canon of Massachusetts products liability
cases; it did not fully break free from the strict liability baggage, and
it did not represent a full-scale reversion to negligence theory, as
the defense bar would no doubt favor.
B. Retention of the Strangely Orthodox Post-Sale Duty to Warn
During the modern era of Massachusetts products liability law,
courts have been wary of expanding the duty to give warnings to
users after the product has been sold.452 While such a duty creates
the prospect of a never-ending, open-ended potential liability, it
also could prevent injuries and save lives.453 Balancing those com
peting policy concerns is a line-drawing exercise, and it invites the
application of a flexible rule of reason that takes into account the
450. See David R. Geiger & Stephanie C. Martinez, Design and Warning Defect
Claims under Massachusetts Product Liability Law: Completing the Merger of Negli
gence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON B. J. 12, 12 (1999).
451. See id. at 27.
452. See Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984) (explaining limits
of post-sale duty to warn), abrogated by Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d 909.
453. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998); Kenneth
Ross & J. David Prince, Post-Sale Duties: The Most Expansive Theory in Products Lia
bility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 963, 965 (2009) (describing post-sale duty to warn as “‘mon
ster duty’”).
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costs and benefits of recognizing a post-sale duty to warn in particu
lar circumstances. Since the 1970s, Massachusetts has recognized a
limited post-sale duty to warn of product dangers.454 On the other
hand, giving notice of safety improvements for products that were
reasonably safe at the time they were manufactured has simply not
been required.455 This no-duty rule is a reminder of the inflexible,
wooden rules that unnaturally hampered recovery in the pre-mod
ern era, like the privity rule or the patent danger rule.456 After Vas
sallo, which explicitly recognized a post-sale duty to warn for at
least direct purchasers and which embraced a negligence-style rea
sonable care standard,457 it might have been expected that the postsale duty to warn would be shorn of this particular no-duty rule.
Although there has been some perception that the post-sale
duty to warn is of recent vintage,458 it has existed throughout the
modern era. In 1975, doCanto v. Ametek, Inc. held that a manufac
turer owed a post-sale duty to warn of design changes and improve
ments that would eliminate the risk from a negligent design.459 This
duty was carefully framed as one that arose from “the manufac
turer’s initial fault” in selling a product that contained a design de
fect, i.e., lacking a safety feature that was feasible at the time of
sale.460 doCanto also noted that the product had also been misrep
resented, which aggravated the manufacturer’s original failure to
design the product safely enough.461 Thus, the post-sale duty to
warn could be understood as an obligation to ameliorate risk
caused by one’s own negligent behavior.462 Having established that
limitation, doCanto opened the door a bit wider by suggesting that
454. doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878-79 (Mass. 1975).
455. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276.
456. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 483; Aaron D. Twerski,
Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation:
Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 524
(1982) (discussing demise of single factor no-duty rules); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (1998) (noting the erosion of restrictive rules which made
recovery difficult in design and warning cases).
457. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998)
(noting manufacturer remains subject to continuing duty to warn while rejecting pre
sumption of knowledge if failure to warn cases).
458. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 865 n.7 (Mass. 2001). The trial court in
Lewis v. Ariens Co. found the timing of Vassallo’s recognition of a post-sale duty to
warn to be crucial in resolving that issue, apparently believing that Vassallo had created
the basis for a new theory of liability. Id.
459. doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 878.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.

R
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“there may be a duty to give reasonable warning of a product’s dan
gers which are discovered after the sale.”463
This uncertain extension was made clearer in 1984, when
Hayes v. Ariens Co. said that the duty to warn of subsequently dis
covered risks did exist for “properly designed” products.464 Hayes
was quick to say, however, that the duty to give notice of design
improvements only applied to products that were defectively de
signed at the time of sale, and that the post-sale duty to warn had
never been recognized as extending to remote purchasers (i.e., be
yond the consumer buying the product new).465 After Hayes, there
was a delineation between the post-sale duty to warn of a product’s
inherent risks, and the post-sale duty to warn of safety improve
ments that would reduce risk; the former duty extended to all prod
ucts, and the latter duty extended to negligently designed
products.466
Massachusetts courts generally did not attempt to justify the
distinction, beyond noting the extent to which prior decisions had,
and had not, recognized a post-sale duty to warn.467 Williams v.
Monarch Machine Tool Co. Inc. 468 and City of Boston v. United
States Gypsum Co. 469 were able, in almost ipse dixit 470 fashion, to
dispatch arguments that the duty to warn of safety improvements
should be extended to products that had not been deemed defec
tively designed at the time of sale.471 The harshness of this rule
could be seen in Williams, in which a worker was injured by an
463. Id. at 879 n.9.
464. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
465. Id.
466. doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 878-79; Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276.
467. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276 (“[W]e have never said, that a manufacturer has a
duty to advise purchasers about post-sale safety improvements that have been made to
a machine that was reasonably safe at the time of sale.”).
468. Williams v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 26 F.3d 228, 232-33 (1st Cir. 1994).
469. City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393-94 (Mass. App.
1994).
470. Ipse Dixit means “something asserted but not proved.” BLACK’S LAW DIC
TIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009).
471. See also Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). In
Cigna, the First Circuit again noted that the post-sale duty to warn of design improve
ments was limited to negligently designed products, but there the plaintiff had con
vinced a jury on sufficient evidence that a sauna heater contained a design defect at the
time it was made. Id. at 12-13. As a result, the manufacturer had a post-sale duty to
give notice of safety improvements instituted just a year or two after the sale. Id. at 13
14.
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industrial machine that lacked a certain safety guard.472 There was
evidence that a safety guard had been developed by the defendant
itself after the machine had been manufactured, but before the acci
dent.473 During this interim period, the defendant manufacturer
serviced the machine and was aware that the machine lacked the
guard.474 The jury, considering the state of technology existing at
the time of sale, found no design defect.475 The jury may well have
found, had it been given the opportunity, that giving notice of the
subsequently developed guard was feasible and in keeping with a
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, especially since
the design improvement had occurred shortly after the sale and was
quickly adopted.476 In any event, the failure to give a post-sale
warning helped lead to a severe injury that could have been easily
prevented.477
Lewis v. Ariens Co. 478 was the first significant post-sale duty to
warn case subsequent to Vassallo, giving the Supreme Judicial
Court a chance in 2001 to elaborate on the Massachusetts post-sale
duty to warn in light of the Restatement. Vassallo had used the new
Restatement as support to abolish the hindsight test.479 The new
Restatement also recognized a post-sale duty to warn that differed
from the Massachusetts rule.480 The plaintiff in Lewis urged the
court to adopt explicitly the new Restatement’s post-sale warning
standard, which the court was willing to do, calling it “a natural
extension” of the ruling in Vassallo.481 Section 10 of the new Re
statement is essentially a reasonable care standard that qualifies the
post-sale duty to warn in important ways that distinguish it from the
more open-ended duty to warn of a product’s risk at the time of the
472. Williams, 26 F.3d at 232.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 229 (new shielding equipment had been available for ten years at time
of accident). The First Circuit in Williams explained that its unwillingness to expand
the post-sale duty to warn stemmed from the limits of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 232.
It lectured that “litigants who reject a state forum in order to bring suit in federal diver
sity jurisdictions cannot expect that new trails will be blazed.” Id. Of course, after the
First Circuit’s virtual rebellion against the hindsight test in Anderson v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986), such reticence was, to say the least, selective. See supra
Part II.B.
478. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001).
479. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998).
480. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998).
481. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 866-67.
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original sale.482 Section 10 is limited to “substantial” risks of harm;
it is also limited to situations where the users can be identified and
the warning can be effectively communicated to those users.483 Fi
nally, manufacturers may escape the post-sale duty to warn if the
burden (i.e., cost) is “sufficiently great” in relation to the risk of
harm.484 The new Restatement also envisions that trial courts will
actively screen post-sale duty to warn claims before submitting
them to juries.485 By adopting section 10, Lewis was adopting a
standard that carefully calibrated the responsibilities of manufac
turers to provide ongoing warnings; it was not a bold step. On its
essential points, Lewis was mostly a refinement of previously-ex
isting principles.486 On its facts, Lewis held that there was no postsale duty to warn owed to a person who had purchased a second
hand snow blower some sixteen years after the original sale.487
Under those circumstances, the second-hand purchaser was part of
a universe of users too difficult to identify, a holding fully consistent
with the long-held reluctance to require post-sale warnings to “re
mote purchasers.”488
Despite engaging in some lengthy deliberation in whether to
make this section of the new Restatement part of Massachusetts
law, Lewis failed to address the one aspect of the existing Massa
chusetts rule that differed from section 10. Section 10, like the law
of many jurisdictions, “does not draw a sharp distinction between
failure to warn of risk and failure to warn of safety improve
ments.”489 The dichotomy in Massachusetts law between warning
of risks and warning of risk-avoidance measures is missing from the
new Restatement.490 One would have expected that adopting a
provision of the new Restatement would have been done for the
purpose of changing Massachusetts law in areas that differ from the
Restatement. Otherwise, there is little point in the exercise. Yet,
Lewis can only be read to affirm the rule limiting the post-sale duty
482. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998).
483. Id. § 10(b)(1)-(3).
484. Id. § 10(b)(4).
485. Id. § 10 cmt. a.
486. See Kalsow v. Shaughnessy Crane Service, Inc., No. 06-P-1565, 2007 WL
4441080 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 19, 2007) (“Lewis did not establish a new principle, but
clarified the interpretation of existing law.”).
487. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867-68 (Mass. 2001).
488. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
489. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 Reporters’ Note.
490. Id.
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to warn of safety improvements, since it noted that Vassallo had
done nothing to change the rule, and Lewis did nothing to upset the
status quo.491 Perhaps Lewis did not realize this difference between
Massachusetts law and the new Restatement, since it appeared to
accept section 10 without reservation.492
Lewis and subsequent decisions have shown that establishing
the feasibility of giving post-sale warnings will continue to be the
most significant hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.493 With the pas
sage of time, the already tenuous links between the manufacturer
or retail seller and the consumer vanish.494 When a snow blower is
re-sold informally as in Lewis,495 or when a piece of construction
equipment is re-sold on three different occasions over thirty
years,496 the ability of a manufacturer or a seller to deliver a mean
ingful warning is virtually non-existent. As a result, the scope of the
post-sale duty to warn is hardly poised to spiral out of control under
the new Restatement. In fact, it may turn out that the economic
and practical feasibility of giving post-sale warnings becomes an ad
ded limitation on the duty to warn where the manufacturer’s “initial
fault” had led to a design defect. Massachusetts law prior to the
new Restatement did not recognize such a limitation where “initial
fault” had been established.497 The new Restatement should be
used to expand the post-sale duty to warn to situations in which a
post-sale warning about design improvements can be done with lit
tle effort or little cost. This can often be done where the seller and
purchaser have an ongoing relationship. There is no good reason
for Massachusetts to hew to its no-duty rule with respect to safety
improvements when the scope of the post-sale duty to warn has al
ready been judiciously managed.498
491. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 865.
492. Id. at 866-67.
493. See, e.g., Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 697-98 (8th Cir.
2007) (no duty to warn remote user, citing Lewis).
494. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 cmt. e (explaining
how lack of customer records make it difficult to identify users).
495. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 863.
496. Hanlan v. Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Nov. 13, 2008) (entering summary judgment for a product manufacturer on a post-sale
warning claim because the duty to warn did not extend to remote purchasers).
497. See doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1975) (postsale
warnings reasonable step to eliminate risk created by manufacturer’s “initial fault”);
City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (no
post-sale duty to warn where product is reasonably safe at time of sale).
498. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 Reporters’ Note (“It is
clear that in most cases it will be difficult to establish each of the four § 10 factors that
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C. Correia, Unreasonable Use, and the Conundrum of Strict
Liability Live On
The judicially-created “unreasonable use” defense recognized
in Correia was put to a stern test in 2006 when the Supreme Judicial
Court was called upon to apply it to cigarettes. The important role
of Correia in Massachusetts products liability litigation was re
vealed in Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc. when the plaintiff, the wife
of a deceased smoker, sought at a very early stage of the case to
preclude, as a matter of law, the Correia defense, which Philip Mor
ris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes smoked by the decedent, had
asserted.499 The plaintiff was determined to achieve clarity on the
unreasonable use defense before she engaged in the expensive dis
covery and trial process.500 Her argument was simple: cigarettes
are a unique product because they cause injury when used exactly
as intended, therefore, it is illogical to think of the “unreasonable
use” of cigarettes as the sole cause of a smoker’s injury, as contem
plated by Correia.501 In order to sharpen the question into a pure
issue of law, the plaintiff made stipulations to clear away issues of
fact, such as admitting that the decedent was aware of the risks of
smoking and acted unreasonably in smoking.502 The fact that the
plaintiff was prepared to stipulate away virtually her entire case, in
the event that the Correia defense was held to apply to cigarettes,
shows that “unreasonable use” had become the main battleground
upon which many Massachusetts products liability cases were
decided.
In coming to the question of whether it would recognize the
“unreasonable use” of a product whose only safe use is nonuse,
Haglund outlined the precepts of the implied warranty of
merchantability.503 It was here that the conundrum of strict liability
re-emerged, after Vassallo had seemingly broken with the nostrums
of the past by discarding the hindsight test and liability without
fault in warning cases.504 Haglund repeated the Strict Liability
Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct Maxim,
while insisting on the “distinct duties and standards of care” for
are a necessary predicate for a post-sale duty to warn if the warning is merely to inform
of the availability of product-safety improvement.”).
499. Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 2006).
500. Id. at 321.
501. Id. at 324.
502. Id. at 321.
503. Id. at 321-23.
504. See supra Part III.A.
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negligence and warranty liability.505 These incantations of strict lia
bility were a break not only from Vassallo, which had implicitly rec
ognized the similarity between negligence and warranty standards,
but also the 2001 cases of Lewis v. Ariens Co. 506 and Hoffman v.
Houghton Chemical Corp. 507 Lewis had stated that in Vassallo,
Massachusetts “abandoned the strict liability approach to implied
warranties of merchantability in favor of a ‘state of the art’ standard
similar to [the one found] in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability § 2(c) (1998).”508 Hoffman acknowledged that
the failure to warn under negligence and the failure to warn under
warranty are governed by the same reasonableness standard, with
the court recognizing the “convergence” of the two theories.509
With Hoffman repeating the observation in Back that the inquiries
under negligence and under warranty in a design case are “‘essen
tially the same,’” a reader of Massachusetts products liability law
would have justly concluded that the days of insisting that a strict
liability facade cover a negligence framework were over.510
Haglund repeated the strict liability rhetoric, even the parts from
Correia about consumers being “entitled to the maximum of pro
tection,” without so much as a nod to the “convergence” an
nounced by the same court five years earlier in Lewis and
Hoffman.511
Haglund also maintained the adherence to section 402A found
in the pre-Vassallo cases, while saying nothing of the new Restate
ment, which had been endorsed in Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoff
man.512 This fidelity to section 402A was curious in light of
Haglund’s holding. It held that in most instances, Correia would be
inapplicable to cigarettes, except when it could be shown that the
505. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323 n.9 (quoting Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525
N.E.2d 1305, 1316 (Mass. 1988)).
506. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001).
507. Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2001).
508. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 865.
509. Hoffman, 751 N.E.2d at 860 n.19 (quoting Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d
964, 970 (Mass. 1978)).
510. Id. at 859 n.19. “The Court will leave the task of distinguishing between
negligence and strict liability in the duty to warn to those who count angels on the
heads of pins.” Id. at 860 n.20 (quoting Nigh v. Dow Chem. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1513,
1517 (W.D. Wis. 1986)).
511. Haglund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Mass. 2006) (quoting
Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983)) (internal
quotations omitted).
512. Hoffman, 751 N.E.2d at 859; Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 866-67; Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 (Mass. 1998).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt

unknown

Seq: 69

27-SEP-11

9:54

2011] EVOLUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

69

plaintiff had begun smoking at a time when he knew of a specific
medical condition that would be exacerbated by cigarette use, i.e.,
an emphysema sufferer who begins smoking.513 The logic of strip
ping away Correia was compelling for cigarettes. The “unreasona
ble use” doctrine presumed that normal use was safe, but cigarettes
are always dangerous.514 Correia was designed to encourage con
sumers to use products more safely, but safer use could only mean
not using the product, “which runs contrary to our entire scheme of
commerce,” not to mention Philip Morris’ business model.515
Haglund relied upon section 402A for the rationale that the cost of
reasonably foreseeable injuries should be borne by those who place
products on the market, but it omitted the fact that section 402A
never envisioned liability flowing from the inherent dangers of ciga
rettes. Comment i to section 402A states that “[g]ood tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
may be harmful.”516 By “good tobacco,” it meant unadulterated
tobacco, distinguishing a tobacco product that contained some ma
rijuana, which could make the product unreasonably dangerous.517
Of course, section 402A’s treatment of tobacco is itself open to crit
icism since attitudes toward tobacco and the knowledge of to
bacco’s risks have grown greatly since 1965.518 But section 402A
had long been seen as a dead end for cigarette plaintiffs.519 Philip
Morris’ analogies to products like sugar and suntan oil, which also
carry certain risks, were rejected as false by Haglund,520 but com
ment i had credited those same kinds of analogies, including the
one about sugar.521
The preference for section 402A’s strict liability tenets seems
to have been deliberate, since it would have provided a more openended standard for judging the inherent risks of a product, and the
513. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 326-27.
514. Id. at 324.
515. Id. at 325.
516. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
517. See id.
518. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (recognizing prisoner’s
claim under Eighth Amendment of Constitution for exposure to secondhand smoke).
519. See Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The “New” Wave in Smoking and
Health Litigation–Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 585 (1987) (not
ing that comment i is often “the beginning and the end of [the] analysis” in cigarette
suits).
520. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 325.
521. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i.
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standard did not specifically exclude tobacco from liability.522 It is
hard to see Haglund as anything but a retrograde opinion, meant to
re-introduce the notion, if not the actuality, of strict liability into
Massachusetts products liability law.523 As it did so, Haglund was
reaffirming Correia itself, making clear that cigarettes were a spe
cial case. So Haglund may have opened the doors, at least theoreti
cally, to broader cigarette liability, and it may provide ammunition
for future litigants to argue for the adoption of non-fault-based
standards, but product manufacturers and sellers won the broader
victory by keeping in place a complete defense. Haglund might
have taken the opportunity presented by a cigarette case to abolish
Correia and account for the plaintiff’s negligent conduct, to the ex
tent it existed, as part of the jury’s comparative fault decision. It
could have taken that step by admitting, as recent decisions of the
Supreme Judicial Court had done, that the reasonableness of the
manufacturer’s conduct is at issue in design and warning cases,524
and therefore the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct can be
weighed against it. Correia’s refusal to subject warranty claims to
the comparative negligence regime was grounded in the belief that
all product defect actions were based on strict liability, a miscon
ception that Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoffman had apparently
solved.525 Haglund allowed that misconception to continue.
Haglund’s rhetorical triumph for strict liability and consumer pro
tection carried with it a practical defeat for injured consumers.
D. The Unresolved Place of the Reasonable Alternative Design
Part II.C of this Article described how during the 1980s and
1990s a reasonable alternative design became required in federal
courts applying Massachusetts law, while the question of whether
that element of proof was truly required in Massachusetts state
courts remained unanswered. That ambiguity has persisted in the
decisions that have followed Vassallo. Federal courts have contin
ued to state with confidence, following the First Circuit’s 1990 deci
522. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998). It would
be fair to say, however, that the new Restatement does not create a receptive environ
ment to a cigarette suit in that categorical liability is thought to be inappropriate for
widely distributed products. Id. at cmt. d.
523. Haglund seems to have been written as if Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoffman had
not been decided. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 321-23.
524. Back v. Wickes, 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978); Vassallo v. Baxter Health
care Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 (Mass. 1998).
525. Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 859 (Mass. 2001); Lewis
v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (Mass. 2001); Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.
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sion in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,526 that the plaintiff must
prove the existence of a safer alternative design in a design defect
claim.527 In Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff was in
jured using a table saw.528 He put forward two theories as to why
the saw was defectively designed.529 For each theory, an expert tes
tified about other designs which the expert believed were safer.530
Gillespie held that one of those theories was flawed and could not
be the basis for recovery because the arguably better design would
not have prevented the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff.531 In
Gillespie, the reasonable alternative requirement was essential to
the decision because the proof on that point was held to be insuffi
cient, necessitating a new trial.532 Meanwhile, Massachusetts state
courts have continued to hint at the importance of a safer alterna
tive design, but they have not spoken with the clarity of federal
courts.
Haglund, unlike Kotler, was a cigarette case premised upon a
safer alternative design.533 The plaintiff in Haglund argued that
Philip Morris could have marketed a non-addictive cigarette with
the nicotine removed.534 Although the issue on appeal pertained to
the Correia defense, and not the viability of the plaintiff’s design
defect theory, Haglund did say that “[t]he plaintiff need only con
vince the jury that a safer alternative design was feasible, not that”
it had been adopted by any manufacturer in the industry.535 This
statement, as the court had done in previous decisions from the
1980s, skirted the question of whether the alternative design is es
sential, rather than just a sufficient basis for presenting a design
claim to a jury.536 To the extent it can be argued that a reasonable
alternative design requirement is implicit in the court’s discussion in
Haglund, it does not seem to be a mistake that Massachusetts fed
eral courts have spoken clearly on the subject, and state courts have
526. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
527. See Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2004); Public
Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 3884342, at *5 (D. Mass 2008).
528. Gillespie, 386 F.3d at 24-25.
529. Id. at 25.
530. Id. at 26-28.
531. Id. at 27.
532. Id. at 31.
533. Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 2006).
534. Id.
535. Id. at 323.
536. See supra Part II.C (discussion of previous decision avoiding question of
whether reasonable alternative design is required).
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not.537 Haglund also emphasized strict liability under the implied
warranty of merchantability even for “properly designed” prod
ucts,538 as did Colter, Correia, and Hayes during the 1980s.539 The
reluctance to finally decide this issue suggests that Massachusetts
courts are unwilling to tie themselves to a reasonable alternative
design requirement. After all, Haglund’s broad language condemn
ing cigarettes as inherently unsafe may have signaled a willingness
to impose liability where Kotler did not, that is, under a design de
fect theory that the risks of cigarettes outweigh their utility.
The impact of not explicitly requiring a reasonable alternative
design is unlikely to lead to many products being condemned for
inherent attributes that cannot be made any safer, like castor oil,
whiskey, or butter, invoked by section 402A. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts does allow for an exception to the reasonable alter
native design requirement when the product has very low social
utility and a high degree of danger.540 It has been rare for courts
anywhere to make that judgment.541 Rather than making a frontal
assault on the overall danger of a product, plaintiffs are more likely
to make criticisms of certain design features, while wishing not to
be held to the burden of showing how those features could be made
better. Expert testimony is ordinarily required to meet that bur
den,542 and even with expert testimony, the supposedly better de
sign can be attacked by defense counsel in the same way that the
defendant’s original design was attacked.543 The alternative design
might carry its own risks, and it might not, as was true in Gillespie,

537. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323; see Fidalgo v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 775
N.E.2d 803, 808-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). In Fidalgo, the appeals court assumed that
the Supreme Judicial Court in Colter and Uloth had required a safer alternative design.
Id. at 808. In characterizing those holdings, however, Fidalgo inserted the word
“must,” a word that neither Colter or Uloth used. Id. Fidalgo held that a design claim
was inadequate where the proposed alternative design was simply not feasible. Id. at
808-09.
538. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323.
539. See Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313 (Mass. 1988) (cita
tions omitted).
540. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998).
541. See id. § 2 Reporters’ Note.
542. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys. Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 372,
380 (D. Mass. 2008); Goffredo v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 520 N.E.2d 1315, 1318-19
(Mass. 1988).
543. See, e.g., Fidalgo v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 775 N.E.2d 803, 806-09
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
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have prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff.544 In Smith v.
Ariens Co., the plaintiff was allowed to recover based on apparent
deficiencies in a snowmobile’s design.545 The design feature that
caused harm seemed unwise and was probably fixable, but the
plaintiff did not have to show how exactly the snowmobile should
have been designed.546 As it stands now under Massachusetts law,
a reasonable alternative design is a recognized way of proving a
design defect case, but it may not be the only way.
IV. THE FUTURE

AND A

BETTER WAY FORWARD

The modern era of Massachusetts products liability law has
been plagued by the conundrum of strict liability. It has led to doc
trinal incoherence, wooden rules, and outcomes that do not benefit
society. Reasonable people can differ over policy objectives, but
there should be no argument over the need for change when the
law fails to effectuate widely shared goals. Massachusetts products
liability law should be changed in some specific ways, which this
Article discusses, but more importantly, Massachusetts courts need
a more logical framework for allocating burdens of proof, setting
standards of conduct, and balancing competing interests. The Re
statement (Third) of Torts provides a clear, functional approach to
deciding products liability cases, and one which is fundamentally
consistent with longstanding precedent. With that approach in
mind, this Article argues for the overdue rationalization of Massa
chusetts products liability law.
A. Agnosticism over Doctrinal Labels
The new Restatement has attempted to avoid the pitfalls asso
ciated with doctrinal categories. The rules it states are functional,
and so long as those functional requirements are met, it expresses
no opinion on how the claims are denominated.547 While that dip
lomatic approach has its virtues, this Article argues that “negli
gence” and “strict liability” have acquired so much baggage, have
meanings, which are so imprecise, and have caused so much mis
chief. It would be best, at a minimum, to refrain from using “strict
liability” to describe the theory of products liability in Massachu
544. Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 27-29 (1st Cir. 2004) (dis
cussing contradictory evidence on whether alternative design would have prevented
injury).
545. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957-58 (Mass. 1978).
546. Id. at 958-59.
547. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).
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setts. The “strict liability” label has led Massachusetts courts to re
peatedly claim that in design and warning cases, they are only
looking at the product, and not the conduct of the defendant, as if
the product could be shipped to a laboratory and the absence of a
warning could be viewed under a microscope, in the way a manu
facturing flaw could be. In reality, design choices and the choices
whether to give warnings involve a defendant’s conduct. Ending
the conundrum of strict liability would stop the perplexing practice
of what one scholar has described as calling “a pig a mule.”548
B. Acknowledging Fault and Non-Fault Based Standards
Removing “strict liability” from the vocabulary does not mean
that liability without fault does not exist in Massachusetts. Indeed,
liability without fault has an appropriate place in Massachusetts
products liability law. On the other hand, most of the important
questions during the modern era have been resolved, and will con
tinue to be resolved, under fault-based, reasonableness stan
dards.549 This may not satisfy doctrinal purists, but a mixture of
fault-based and non-fault-based rules will best advance social pol
icy. Under Massachusetts law and the new Restatement, a con
sumer injured due to a manufacturing defect in a product need not
prove the product manufacturer or seller was at fault.550 Similarly,
inadvertent design error cases, in which the product manifestly fails
to perform as intended, such as when an airplane’s wings fall off
during normal operation, should allow for recovery without the
plaintiff needing to prove that the manufacturer’s negligence led to
a product defect.551 That defect can be inferred from the circum
stances, and liability can follow without direct proof of fault.552 In
addition, the liability of a product seller, such as a distributor or
548. David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Lia
bility Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 749 (“Quite simply, most courts have been saying
one thing while doing quite another—calling a pig a mule.”).
549. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing risk-utility standard for design claims); supra
Part III.A (discussing fault-based standard for duty to warn); supra Part III.B (discuss
ing reasonableness standard for post-sale duty to warn).
550. See Gleason v. Source Perrier, 553 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (af
firming liability in case of manufacturing defect in bottle); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378
N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) (noting straightforward application of liability without
fault in case of manufacturing defect); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.
§ 2(a).
551. See Carey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583 (1979) (theory of design
defect based on improper engineering practice upheld without showing of alternative
design); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b.
552. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3.
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retailer who is not involved in the design or manufacture of the
product, is vicarious in nature.553 The seller of a product that is
defectively designed due to the design choices of the manufacturer
may be held liable for that defect even though the seller did nothing
negligent.554
Fault-based standards have been dominant in Massachusetts
products liability law, as they are in the new Restatement, and in
other jurisdictions in the United States.555 As this Article has
pointed out, the Back design defect factors are mostly a refinement
of the Judge Learned Hand’s B<PL negligence formulation, and
Massachusetts law has always judged a manufacturer’s design
choices by nothing more than a rule of reason.556 A designer must
only design against reasonably foreseeable risks.557 The duty to
warn, at least since Vassallo, has extended only to risks that are
known or should have been known to an expert in the field.558 The
adequacy of warnings has always been governed by a reasonable
ness standard.559 Massachusetts courts have permitted a product
manufacturer to discharge his duty to warn through intermediaries,
so long as the reliance upon the intermediary is reasonable.560 The
post-sale duty to warn, whatever its limitations, has been extended
no further than an obligation to act reasonably under the circum
stances.561 These reasonableness standards are aimed at judging
conduct, because “the goal of products liability law is to induce con
duct that is capable of being performed.”562
Where Massachusetts products liability law has gone off
course, it has not been because these flexible fault-based standards
have been found wanting. Indeed, it was through application of
negligence principles that the patent danger rule was eliminated in
553. See id. § 2 cmt. o.
554. See id.
555. See id. § 2 Reporters’ Note (surveying fifty states and finding risk-utility
standard dominant); Owen, supra note 548, at 785-88 (noting the “explosion” of the
myth of strict liability in design and warning cases).
556. See supra Part I.D.4.
557. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978).
558. Vassallo v. Baxter, 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998); Lewis v. Ariens Co.,
751 N.E.2d 862, 865-66 (Mass. 2001) (re-affirming knew or should have known standard
for duty to warn).
559. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass.
1985).
560. See Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 858-59 (Mass. 2001)
(bulk supplier doctrine); MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 68-70.
561. See supra Part III.B.
562. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt

76

unknown

Seq: 76

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

9:54

[Vol. 33:1

Uloth and the intended use paradigm was abolished in developing
crashworthiness standards in Smith and Back.563 When Massachu
setts courts began to embrace the rigidity of the supposedly pro
gressive strict liability standard, unjust and perplexing results began
to appear due to wooden rules that appeared detached from any
social policy justification. When Correia introduced the “unreason
able use” defense in the name of strict liability, the seemingly dead
assumption of risk and patent danger rules were revived.564 In a
stroke, the often complex issue of the plaintiff’s conduct toward the
product became a yes or no question that often served as a com
plete bar to recovery.565 As a result, negligence claims have often
been a better vehicle for recovery.566 Warranty seems only to offer
the unreasonable use defense while maintaining the same design
and warning standards as negligence.
C. Recognizing the Convergence and Clarifying the Muddle
With the insight that in design and warning cases, negligence
and warranty standards are essentially the same, it is clear that the
inquiries made by courts and juries need to be simplified. Asking
finders of fact to make fine doctrinal distinctions that had no sub
stance in reality was never wise. As this Article has pointed out,
these distinctions created the need to apply the overlapping analy
ses of reasonably foreseeable misuse, unreasonable use, proximate
cause, ordinary negligence, and comparative fault to the fact, for
example, that a product user did not wear goggles.567 As the Re
statement (Third) of Torts holds, factually identical design and
warning claims should not be submitted to a jury under different
doctrinal labels.568 The new Restatement warns, and experience in
Massachusetts has shown, doing so would lead to confusion and in
consistent verdicts.569 Similarly, with the insight that it is the rea
sonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct at issue in design and
563. See supra Parts I.D.2 and I.D.3; see also Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384
N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978); Back v.
Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978).
564. See supra Part II.A; see also Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446
N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983).
565. See supra Part II.A (discussing contours of unreasonable use defense).
566. See supra Part II.A (discussing plaintiffs’ difficulty in recovering under war
ranty claims); Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Mass. 1988)
(plaintiff recovered on negligence claim but not on warranty claim).
567. See supra notes 301-306 (discussing Allen II).
568. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).
569. See Correia, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (inconsistent jury instruction submitted by the
court); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n.
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warning cases, the comparative fault statute should be applied to
judge the conduct of the plaintiff and to act as a complete or partial
defense. Applying a unitary standard and submitting a factual
claim of warning or design defect just once to the jury will require
the elimination of the Correia defense. Once the fiction, that the
defendant’s conduct is not at issue, is removed, the theoretical basis
for Correia vanishes, and the plaintiff’s conduct can be judged
under the comparative fault statute. Besides, it would complicate,
rather than simplify, matters to allow the unreasonable use defense
to be layered on top of the comparative fault defense.570 Without
Correia, the jury would be allowed to decide in a design case, where
the plaintiff’s use of the product arguably diverged from the manu
facturer’s intended use, whether the use was reasonably foresee
able, whether the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury in light of the plaintiff’s use of the product, and whether the
plaintiff’s conduct was negligent under the comparative fault stat
ute.571 That would be a comprehensible and logical analysis.
Clarifying the muddle will also require careful thought by
courts in delineating affirmative defenses from elements of the
plaintiff’s proof. The two may look similar when the defendant is
attempting to negate the plaintiff’s proof; the defendant’s attack
may look like a defense. Misuse should not be seen as an affirma
tive defense, a mistake the First Circuit made in Cigna Insurance
Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., where the error meant that the defendant
had the burden of showing sufficient evidence to warrant a jury in
struction on the issue.572 In fact, misuse is not a distinct concept;573
the question simply is whether the use was reasonably foreseeable
or not.574
D. Getting Rid of Wooden Rules and Making Wise Policy
Choices
This Article has argued that the distinction between the postsale duty to warn of risks and the post-sale duty to warn of risk
570. See generally, Correia, 446 N.E.2d 1033.
571. As this Article has previously argued, the foreseeability analysis usually in
volved in proximate cause should drop out in a case involving a manufacturer’s failure
to include a safety device in the design of a product, as it overlaps with the antecedent
duty question, which also hinges on reasonable foreseeability. See supra Part II.A (cit
ing Twerski, supra note 280).
572. Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
573. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. p.
574. See Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Mass. 1986) (hold
ing that a plaintiff must prove the use (or alleged misuse) was reasonably foreseeable).
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avoidance measures is arbitrary and has never been justified.575
This is a wooden rule that can be rectified by doing nothing more
than requiring the manufacturer or seller to act with reasonable
care under the circumstances. The touchstone of duty in a post-sale
failure to warn case is the economic and practical feasibility of giv
ing a warning to the user.576 Once that feasibility is established,
which is no easy matter,577 and the risk to the user is non-negligible,
there is no good reason to withhold notice of a product’s risks, or to
withhold notice of a design improvement that would reduce risk.
The implied warranty of merchantability, despite its alleged
congruence with strict liability in tort, contains a technical limita
tion that appears to have no basis in public policy, if it is indeed
true that the implied warranty of merchantability imposes duties by
the operation of law rather than by contract.578 It has been held
that there is no implied warranty made unless there has been a sale
or a lease.579 As a result, a person who test-drove a vehicle from an
automobile dealership did not enjoy the protection of the implied
warranty of merchantability.580 The distinction between the driver
who test-drives a vehicle, and the driver who drives that same vehi
cle out of the lot after purchasing it, is akin to the old privity rule in
that it erects an artificial barrier to recovery unconnected to any
policy objective. While it appears that only the legislature can rem
edy this deficiency,581 it should do so, as this rule undermines the
policy of broad consumer protection.
This Article has pointed out that the place of the reasonable
alternative design requirement remains an open question in Massa
chusetts state courts.582 This ambiguity serves no constructive pur
pose. If, as has been hinted, proof of a reasonable alternative
design is required, litigants ought to know because the expense of
providing the proof can be considerable.583 If there is some cate
575. See supra Part III.B.
576. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10(b) (illustrating that
three of four factors involve burden and feasibility of giving post-sale warning).
577. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass. 2001) (stating that
it is not feasible to warn second hand purchaser of snow blower).
578. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a
duty under implied warranty of merchantability is imposed by law as a matter of social
policy, not by contract).
579. Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 441-42 (Mass. 1986).
580. See id.
581. See id.
582. See supra Parts I.D.1, II.C, and III.D.
583. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 372,
380 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating expert testimony almost always required).
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gory of cases where the alternative design requirement does not ap
ply, then that category should be carefully defined. In a case
assailing the conscious design choices of the manufacturer, the Re
statement (Third) of Torts requires a practical, feasible, safer alter
native design in order to show a design defect.584 There is an
exception for manifestly unreasonable designs that involve gratui
tous risk and virtually no social value.585 This balance honors con
sumer choice in that widely distributed products, like above-ground
swimming pools, cannot be condemned on a categorical basis.586
Where the plaintiff takes issue with particular design features of the
product, by suggesting that the features should not exist or should
be different, a reasonableness standard quickly generates questions
about how removing or changing the contested design features
would impact the cost, usefulness or attractiveness of the product,
or how it would create other risks.587 Without an alternative design
as a point of comparison, juries will be asked to engage in rootless
reasonableness inquiries of relative risk. They would be placed in
the position of attempting to re-conceive the design process, evalu
ating the tradeoffs between functionality, cost, and safety that the
original designer made, but without all of the information or the
expertise possessed by the original designer. Evaluating conscious
design choices in reference to a proposed alternative design makes
an already difficult task manageable. In short, plaintiffs need to be
put to the burden of proving a technically feasible, reasonable alter
native design that would have prevented the injury suffered, as win
ning plaintiffs have generally done in Massachusetts.588
CONCLUSION
The longstanding attachment to section 402A of the Restate
ment (Second) of Torts, and to the rhetoric of strict liability, shown
by Massachusetts courts during the modern era of products liability
law ceased, some time ago, to serve the interests of the adjudicatory
process or the interests of consumers or of product sellers. Experi
584. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
585. See id. § 2 cmt. e.
586. See id. § 2 cmt. d.
587. See generally Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1552-58.
588. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (Mass. 1978)
(plaintiff’s verdict on negligent design affirmed where there was evidence of several
design changes that could have made product safer); Richard v. Amer., Mfg. Co., 489
N.E.2d 214 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (plaintiff’s verdict on negligent design upheld where
there was evidence that simple guard would have reduced risk).
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ence has shown that completing the rationalization of Massachu
setts products liability law will require putting aside old nostrums;
the mischief caused by imprecise language and incoherent doctrine
is simply too great. Some forty-five years after its promulgation,
section 402A has run its course, and it is time to adopt explicitly the
standards found in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The new Re
statement’s functional rules represent wise policy, and provide
needed clarity to questions that section 402A did not attempt to
answer. Breaking with past tenets can be difficult in a common law
system that respects precedent, but Massachusetts courts have been
able to make a clean break with products liability rules that no
longer work. When Carter v. Yardley & Co. abolished the privity
rule in negligence actions in 1946, the Supreme Judicial Court was
blunt: “In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust
results. It has been abandoned by the great weight of authority else
where. We now abandon it in this Commonwealth.”589 Notions of
strict liability in design and warning cases are rightly subject to a
similar indictment and deserve a similar fate.

589.

Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946).

